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ABSTRACT 
Traces, Testimony, Paranoia 
Rachel E. Cyr 
Prior to 1984, human rights documentation consisted of eyewitness and victim testimony. 
Since then forensic science has become a staple of human rights investigations. The 
resurgence of positivism consequence of these institutional and procedural shifts inspired 
the metaphorical conflation of physical evidence and physical traces with narrative and 
personal testimony. This thesis considers this tropic drift within human rights discourse 
as an example and a reflection of the epistemological ambivalence and semiotic 
confusion that still surrounds the indexical sign both outside and within critical theory. 
This thesis argues first that traces constitute non-linguistic sign-events whose formal 
properties motivate anecdotal and narrative modes of explanation and second, that the 
growing cultural importance of forensic science reifies a form of paranoic knowledge at 
the heart of western subjectivity. 
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PREFACE 
I never felt that I had chosen the topic of this work. The year prior to the commencement 
of my graduate studies I was in regular conversation with my grandmother who was 
terminally ill with lung cancer. My official excuse to see her so often that year was that 
she needed me to help her finish her family genealogy, which she had spent many 
decades researching between raising a family and tending to the community. Unlike the 
Mennonite communities, which hold detailed genealogical records, my grandmother's 
British lineage was comparatively less certain. So we spent many hours together that 
year trying to link the pieces together. I transcribed by hand the stories and anecdotes she 
wanted to pass down to later generations, and tried to memorize who was whom among 
the various photographs she had in her shoebox archive. Her death was imminent and so 
the urgency to catalogue what we could seemed all the more crucial. As the wife of a 
minister, her manner of speaking of death was usually theological, though occasionally 
she admitted to being afraid. One day she mumbled aloud on the subject of her funeral 
arrangements and she mentioned to me a hymn that was regularly played on the occasion. 
This song, Nana alleged, suggested that after death a person was present in the trees, the 
wind and in the remains. She insisted that she could never allow such a hymn to be 
played at her funeral. "I am theologically opposed to it," she said "when I am gone, 
nothing of me will be here. I'll be with Him. Nothing of me will stay behind." Rightly 
or wrongly, I read her digression as an interdiction against compensating myself for her 
loss with metaphor and metonymy. Nana's complaint belonged to the order of 
Mennonite iconoclasm but with a salient difference, she obviously understood the lure of 
remains and traces, where others only warned of the lure of images. I struggled inwardly 
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to properly place and harness the meaning of the photographs we were identifying 
together, as I did the deodorant and talcum powder I found in the medicine cabinet after 
her passing. I struggled with what was left behind. I wore some of her clothes as 
pajamas, clung to them as I did all the other things I inherited. I loved her and was afraid 
of being unfaithful, forgetting her too quickly. Strangely, I could only think the idolatry 
of the trace through forensic science, which seemed to me the facet of our culture most 
dedicated to the remains of the deceased. Watching Crime Scene Investigation after 
Nana's passing, I was struck by a forensic pathologist stroking the hair of a corpse, the 
ritualistic storytelling from remains, the ritualistic cataloguing and I quickly recognized 
the scene as a familiar one even if it seemed as though one had no reason to relate to the 
other. Theorizing traces meant putting into words something that was already familiar to 
me but was conceptually and theoretically amorphous. Such is the manner that I 
approached this topic: caring less about technology, scopophilia or power/knowledge, the 
question, I would later find out, had more to do with subjectivity, testimony, meaning and 
narration. I have often thought it lucky that forensic science remained meaningful to me 
until the very end, but if I were to give myself more credit I would have to admit that 
Charles Sanders Peirce had something true to offer with his theory of logical abduction— 
the fact of guessing correctly. I have tried, often, to explain the leap from my 
grandmother to forensic science and usually failed miserably to communicate their 
sympathy—and even if their sympathy is still lost to the reader after reading this work, I 
only ask that one consider that I would not have been able to think this piece without first 
trusting the direction of that leap in the beginning. 
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Introduction: Tropic Drifts 
The tortured body retains scars, marks that recall the violence inflicted upon it by the 
torturer. In part because slaves were often tattooed in the ancient world, such marks of 
torture resonate in the Greek mind with tattoos, and with other forms of metaphorical 
inscription [...] a writing tablet. Page DuBois 
Jean Laplanche writes in Life and Death in Psychoanalysis (1970): "The constituted is 
reconstructed from the constituted or, in any event, from the constitutive process which is 
not primal but derived" (129). Metaphor of a metaphor; the physical inscription is 
derivative of another derivation. The tropic genesis is not a genesis at all, it is merely an 
identifiable event that relentlessly defers its origin. Within human rights discourse 
traumatic testimony begets testifying traumas—lesions and scars that testify on their own 
accord and stand in for the narrated testimonies that could not, but should have, been 
salvaged. "Stigmata stings, pierces, makes holes, separates with pinched marks and in 
the same movement distinguishes—re-marks—inscribes, writes" (Cixous xiii). This is a 
tropological genesis spurred by the event of a marking of the skin. This is the beginning 
of a hermetic drift, a closed tropic circuitry based on the Renaissance precept that "the 
similar can be known through the similar" (Eco "Unlimited" 206). The drift is hermetic 
and contained because the constraints of discourse call for the derivation; discourse 
condones and supports the founding of a homology across the fields of the linguistic and 
the somatic. A witness account morphs into a splatter of blood and dermal fissures 
because trauma begets trauma. The ruptured spleen and the internal hemorrhage 
announce their status as traumatic testimony. When the communicative function of the 
victim's testimony is displaced and condensed onto a dismembered limb it is not 
arbitrary, it's not an empty figure or a 'mere' rhetorical trick—indeed, with Jean 
Laplanche and Jonathan Culler, we may ask ourselves if there is such a thing as an 
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'empty figure' at all or anything that would quality as 'merely' rhetoric—it follows 
established etymological and semantic constraints and it corresponds to new physical 
contiguities. What is more, our derivation could not have happened at any time or any 
place; it's happening here and now because it could and because spatio-temporal 
contingencies allowed for their opening. In 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was passed along with the Genocide Convention, largely in reaction to the 
unfathomable misfortunes that befell Europe's Jewish communities during the Second 
World War. Prior to the mid-1980s eyewitness testimony and victim narratives, with the 
notable exception of the photograph, occupied the entire field of human rights 
documentation. Then in 1984 Forensic Anthropologist Clyde Snow, with the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), now known as the Argentine 
Forensic Anthropology Team (EAAF), responded to requests coming from Argentinean 
citizens to help exhume graves rumored to house "Desaparecidos," otherwise known as 
the forced disappearances resulting from the Condor military regime (1976-1983). And 
the semiological field mushroomed. It might have happened in 1955 when, in the name 
of human rights, the results of a medical investigation were presented at the Nuremburg 
Trial by the pathologists of the British Army (Cordner and McKelvie 867), but we know 
that meaning is a retroactive achievement (Lacan; Culler 18). The second event gives 
meaning to the first and so on and so on. (S «- S') The event of a handful of British 
pathologists testifying at the Nuremburg trials passed innocuously, retrospectively, 
A 
though, we understand that it initiated a period of gestation. 
Different sources disagree on the question of forensic science's initiation to human rights. A politically 
contentious though ironic alternative genenis is the Official Material on the Mass Murder at Katyn drafted 
by Nazi sympathetic pathologists to discredit the Soviet Union prior to the Nuremburg trial (Laqueur 76). 
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Up until 1984, eyewitness and victim testimony constituted the primary means by 
which human rights abuses were recorded documented and presented (Kirshner 451). 
Kay Shaffer and Simonie Smith explain that subsequent to the Second World War, 
Holocaust testimonials were so engrained that they had become "a template for all forms 
of traumatic telling, response and responsibility within the contemporary field of human 
rights" (7). Human rights discourse relied on (auto)biographical narratives of personal 
and collective trauma, the adoption of which advantageously allowed for disenfranchised 
groups to forge a space for themselves in public spheres that had previously been their 
censor. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1996-2000) is the 
quintessential example of a type of public forum where victim narratives and 
confessional witnessing sought the symbolic redress of the social inequities through the 
publicity of traumatic experience. The racial apartheid of South Africa, in that instance, 
was transformed into a shared memory, a collective responsibility, and a ground for 
reconciliation (Hamber 35). What also transpired (and this is noteworthy) is that the 
traumatic witnessing practiced in South Africa and elsewhere paved the way for a 
theatrics and spectacle of psychological and physical trauma. 
Allan Feldman in his article "Memory Theatres, Virtual Witnessing, and the 
Trauma-Aesthetic" (2004) argues that a distinct culture of oration transpired where 
survivors presented themselves in public forums, such as the media, to describe human 
rights abuses and draw audiences to the horror of the traumatic events they experienced. 
Even if they provided disenfranchised individuals and collectives entry and access to the 
public sphere, the same opportunity opened on the traumatized body (Feldman 167). 
Feldman suggests that even before the most empathetic audiences "the trauma-aesthetic 
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installs and smuggles into human rights discourse a visual genealogy of witnessing and 
testimony-giving that sorts appropriation of the body in pain" (186). In other words, even 
if the circulation of and exposure to traumatic awakenings on the international stage 
exposed the audience to the "language of trauma," to borrow from Cathy Caruth, and 
could theoretically shed light on established structures of oppression, they could also 
occasion the ground for its metaphorical extension to and annexation of the survivor's 
body. The problematic relationship between the body and speech forthcoming in public 
traumatic witnessing recalls Nancy Fraser's criticism of the Habermasian bourgeois 
public sphere. It is, she writes, impossible for interlocutors to erase or bracket class, 
gender and racial differences in the public sphere because the bodily presence of an 
interlocutor is always already implicated and affecting the nature of discourse (Fraser 
109). The commonalities between Fraser's reading of the bourgeois public sphere and 
Feldman's take of human rights testimonials lies, however, with the fact that the optical 
and physical dimensions of public testimony can advantageously use the body as an alibi 
for delegitimization or, alternatively, as an "authenticating" (Feldman 167) presence to 
the traumatic event communicated in the speech act. In this way, the analogical drift 
from the traumatic content of testimony to the physical body reinforces and reverses the 
analogy at the heart of the etymological history of the term trauma itself—that is, 
between the foundational medical definition of trauma as a physical injury and/or lesion 
to the surface of the body and its psychoanalytic analogue, the psychic trauma. 
Laplanche and Pontalis in The Language of Psychoanalysis (1967) explain: 
Trauma is a term that has long been used in medicine and surgery. [...] It generally means 
any injury where the skin is broken as a consequence of external violence and the effects 
of such an injury is not always present, however—we may speak, for example, of 
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'closed' head and brain traumas. In adopting the term psychoanalysis carries the three 
ideas implicit in it over on to the psychical level: the idea of a violent shock, the idea of a 
wound and the idea of consequences affecting the whole organism." (465-466) 
Because traumatic witnessing regularly involves bodily presence or the presentation of 
bodies, human rights trials, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
constitute rhetorical events through which the routine iteration of traumatic experience 
allows for the simultaneity of utterance and body, and potentially, their metaphorical 
conflation. The tropological foundation of the notion of trauma is the precedent that 
allows for this derivation as do the structural and rhetorical norms that define the 
discourse of human rights.2 Feldman draws on Page DuBois' work on torture in fifth-
century Athens to draw out the nebulous political, scopophilic benefits and conveniences 
that follow the displacement and extension of textuality from speech to body. In ancient 
Greece, the analogical chain began with the tattoo and moved to the lesion, and the 
movement from enunciation to inscription that it inaugurated resulted in the full silencing 
of the Athenian slave. "The fusion of linguistic performance and bodily exposure here 
unfolds as a rite of hierarchical observation and consequent authentication" (Feldman 
188). Indeed, Feldman demonstrates how the tactical conflation of body and speech (and 
usually the latter's substitution with the former) traversed the history of the Abolition 
movement in nineteenth century America and, to this day, taints contemporary human 
rights discourse. 
Michael Ignatieff writes: "To what extent do representations of human rights violations position viewers 
rhetorically as "voyeurs of the suffering of others, tourists amid their landscapes of anguish"? (Ignatieff 
qtd. Feldman 186) 
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Page DuBois' research resonates all the more when we consider how forensic scientists are also sought by 
human rights organizations to detect evidence of torture in the living as well as the dead. (Kirshner 453) 
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Feldman's reading of the trauma-aesthetics of human rights discourse awakens us 
to the tropological drift at play between the transmission and representation of the 
traumatic event through narration on the one hand and the emergence of the traumatic 
lesion and/or marking as an alternative or complementary medium of testimony on the 
other. The discursive tension exists at the junction of popular psychoanalytic discourse 
that seeks to convey an "alternative truth" through victim testimony (Felman and Laub 
Testimony)—a truth irreducible to physical trauma—and the medico-scientific discourse 
that underlies and justifies the semiological drift from speech to lesion. This is a 
problem, and it confronts us with the historical precedents of their analogy as well as the 
formal differences between the utterance and physical evidence that are elided in the 
process. 
But the unsteady relationship between narration and the public display of bodily 
markings is not the sole outcome of their spatio-temporal coincidence in the courts or 
their "trauma-aesthetic." Our problematique is cemented by recent but major 
institutional shifts within the practice of human rights documentation—namely, the 
application of forensic science4 to human rights investigations. The incorporation of 
forensic science meant the introduction of a corpus delicti, the material substrate of the 
crime that hints to the perpetrator (Laqueur 75): the bodies upon bodies buried in the 
clandestine graves of Vukuvar, Croatia or the skeletal remains piled in a Rwandan 
church. The corpis delicti of human rights investigations now spans and cuts across 
thirty-three countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Czechoslovakia, El 
4 
Forensic Scientists" broadly encompasses the class of scientists collectively involved in a given 
investigation. Forensic science brings together: forensic pathology, clinical forensic medicine, forensic 
odontology, medical epidemiology, anthropology, molecular biology, radiography, archaeology, ballistics, 
firearms and toolmark examiners, entomology, crime scene examiners, evidence handlers, photographers, 
mortuary technicians, fingerprint experts. 
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Salvador, Guatemala, Kenya, Kurdistan, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, 
Rumania, South Korea, East Timor, Taiwan, Venezuela, the West Bank of Israel, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Chad, while the list grows (Kirshner 456). And the international 
organizations launching forensic investigations are just as numerous: NGOs such as the 
Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation (FAFG), Physicians for Human Rights 
(PHR), the International Forensic Center of Excellence for the Investigation of Genocide, 
Archaeologists for Human Rights (AFHR) and other international bodies such as 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), the United Nations' International 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); and, national bodies such as the US Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). Every one of these inter/national 
bodies has deployed forensic teams around the globe to secure and exhume gravesites. 
The merit of medicolegal documentation to human rights prosecution proved so 
promising that in 1989 both the United Nations Economic and Social Council and the 
General Assembly drafted a protocol: the Manual on the Effective Prevention and 
Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, which detailed the 
proper ways to document and detect evidence of torture and carry through with the 
exhumation of grave sites.5 And in 1992, Resolution 1992/24 was passed to provide 
assistance to forensic investigations. A "Standing Team" of experts was created to 
support international investigations. However, as Stephen Cordner and Helen McKelvie 
write in "Developing Standards in International Forensic Work to Identify Missing 
Persons" (2002), the United Nation's Standing Team was "just a list, without the 
The document, as well as the United Nations attention to the benefits of forensic scientific data, results 
from the consciousness-raising inititatives of US Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights who earlier 
drafted the "Protocol for Preventing Arbitrary Killings through Adequate Death Investigation and Autopsy" 
(1988). 
7 
resources and logistical support required to provide it with the wherewithal to act as its 
name implies" (872). Similarly, the United Nations' Manuel (1989) standardized the 
process of identifying human remains but beyond offering guidelines, rarely enforced 
them. In short, organizations, protocols, manuals and articles emerged at an 
unprecedented rate, but being new, the field was and still is in the process of 
development. What is more, the forensic documentation of mass graves and human 
rights abuses have had little airtime in international courts outside of Argentina and 
Guatemala where forensics was instrumental to the identification of deceased 
individuals,6 and so the question of the legal persuasiveness and effectiveness of forensic 
evidence in the courts is still an open question. 
It is NGO Physicians for Human Rights and the forensic anthropologists who led 
their earliest investigations who are to be credited for the widespread public awareness of 
the potential contributions forensic science could bring to human rights investigations. 
Former PHR consultant and Executive Director Eric Stover (1992-1994) and illustrious 
forensic anthropologist Clyde Snow are personally responsible for the development of an 
important literature on the evolving mandate of forensic science. Eric Stover's tawdry 
pocket-sized biography of Dr. Clyde Snow Witnesses From the Grave: The Stories Bones 
Tell (1991), Graves: Srebrenica and Vokuvar (1998), PHR's Clear Koff s glossy The 
Bone Woman: A Forensic Anthropologist's Search for Truth in the Mass Graves of 
Rwanda. Bosnia. Croatia, and Kosovo (2005) and the Smithsonian's Dr. Douglas 
Ubelacker and Henry ScammelPs Bones: A Forensic Detective's Casebook (1992) 
exemplify how forensic practitioners at the forefront of the movement converted 
See the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatamala, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
held between 1994-1996. 
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themselves and each other into protagonists of marketable true-crime narratives. The 
cultural significance of true crime narration cannot be underestimated here for, as Mark 
Selzter has pointed out in "The Crime System" (2004), they play a formative part of 
traumatic culture and healing, or what he calls the "pathological public sphere" (560). 
"True crime is part of our contemporary wound culture: a culture—or at least, cult—of 
commiseration" (Seltzer 557). Simultaneously field scientists, news correspondents and 
leading (wo)men of a considerable hand-full of true crime narratives, the field workers of 
PHR self-consciously transgressed the cultural divisions between academia and popular 
culture. Their variegated roles, however, also meant that practicing forensic scientists 
were central instrumental agents in establishing and recycling dominant tropes and 
already familiar images from the human rights domain. The indivisibility of physical 
inscription and enunciation traverses scholarly articles, official human rights 
publications, true-crime narratives and news reports. Consider, for example, the official 
mission statement on PHR's website and the following the excerpts from books and news 
reports marketed for popular consumption. 
PHR believes that the dead have powerful stories to tell and that accountability provides 
the most secure foundation for future respect for human rights and humanitarian law, 
assigning individual accountability for what is often seen as collective guilt. By giving 
voice to the voiceless, PHR hopes to ensure that the innocent victims do not die in vain. 
That their stories are heard and their killers brought to justice. 
(Physicians for Human Rights 1) 
With corpses now able to 'speak' to us across a span of decades, there's a renewed 
motivation by law enforcement officials to right the wrongs that have gone unpunished. 
(Mietkiewicz 1998, El) 
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When I got the call from Bill, I was a graduate student in forensic anthropology, but I had 
known for years that my goal was to help end human rights abuses by providing to 
would-be killers that bones could talk. (Koff 7) 
Equating corpses and material evidence with personal testimony is ubiquitous throughout 
the literature, popular, journalistic and academic. Never mind that eyewitness and victim 
testimony are still required to corroborate the scientists' findings, to the forensic scientist 
bones speak and crime scenes are messages written in code. Where the trauma-aesthetic 
described by Allen Feldman introduces us to a scene where the epistemological certainty 
of the body threateningly undermined the integrity of personal testimony, the corpses 
exhumed from clandestine graves invert their relationship; skeletons are invested with the 
communicative capacity the dead would have (theoretically) been able to enact were they 
alive. The tropological reversal effected by forensic practitioners consequently fulfills 
the complete displacement of one to the other; the full subjectivization of material 
evidence counters the de-subjectivization effected through the fugitive nature of voice 
(Connor). In a sense, the supplementation and/or conflation of vocal enunciation with the 
physical marking restores post-mortem the "metaphysics of presence" (Derrida), the 
sense of illusory transparency between a given subject and a mode of communication. 
Whereas Feldman's trauma-aesthetic privileged the bodily trauma because it was not 
tainted by subjectivity, the material inscription of the corpse articulates the impartiality of 
physical evidence with the subjective position that traditionally reverberates in the speech 
act—which is to say, the "intention-to-signify" normally encountered in the real, "the 
non-subjectivizable remainder" of the real (Zizek 213) made apparent in the vocal mode 
of signification. Not without irony, the hierarchical reorganization of speech and textual 
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evidence inflects the vocalic mode with a fugitive character and conversely imbues 
material textuality with 'presence' through their identification—meaning therefore that a 
performative contradiction inheres within the rhetorical transfer of authority, for it is 
through the appropriation of the cultural currency of eyewitness testimony that material 
evidence is in turn posited as both empirically reliable and, through the designation of an 
author-function (Foucault), faithful to the story the living victim would have shared. 
The rhetoric of voice and evidential testimony, however, conceals underlying 
motives. Equating physical evidence with victim testimonials detracts the audience or 
jury from the hermeneutic and interventionist dimensions of scientific investigation. 
Julie Johnson-McGraph's research on the history of forensic pathology in the United 
States indicates that the scientist's dual role as medical examiner and as expert witness 
for the judicial system (which is still true today for many forensic practitioners) meant 
that there existed a real incentive to equate expert testimony with victim narratives 
because the American citizenry traditionally trusted eyewitness reports over 
circumstantial evidence. "The task before the forensic pathologist, therefore, was how to 
transform their interpretation of the circumstantial evidence of the body and the scene of 
the crime to convey it with the immediacy and authority of eyewitness testimony" (453). 
Johnson-McGraph's research makes evident historical precedents of the elision of the 
interpretative and representational phases of the forensic investigation effected through 
the rhetorical rapprochement of eyewitness and expert testimony. The trope of voice 
and/or communication conceals the (un)conscious modes of production that go into the 
interpretative process. Being once removed from the actual event, the forensic scientist 
has no option other than to interpret the residual ruins left at the scene of the crime or 
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within the grave. As Johnson McGraph insists, the forensic scientist is not a "spiritualist 
medium" but an interpreter of scientific evidence (453). 
Hermeneutic philosophers have shown and are very well aware that archival 
documentation is not impervious to social construction or individually determinative of 
interpretative outcomes; that physical evidence is both the product and agent of an 
organizing complex of cultural practices that have far-reaching effects on the dynamic 
identity of past, present and future; and, for that reason, ideological and epistemological 
assumptions inevitably shape and guide the scientist in his or her investigation of crime 
scenes. Does this necessarily imply then that we resign ourselves to radical social 
constructionist theories of scientific research (Hacking)? Does our awareness of the 
formative function of the interpreter and her epistemological assumptions mean that we 
must revolt against the idea of a dynamic relationship between material evidence and 
testimony, memory and knowledge of the past? And this, because the hermeneutic 
process is inflected by societal determinations and rhetorical alibis? 
Ricoeur, who stands among the better-known proponents of hermeneutic 
philosophies of history, suggests that a sense of responsibility to the dead should guide all 
forms of documentary research. In Volume II of Time and Narrative (1983-85), he 
writes: "as soon as the idea of a debt to the dead, to people of flesh and blood to whom 
something really happened in the past, stops giving documentary research its highest end, 
history loses its meaning" (118). Positivistic theories of historical knowledge (with 
which Paul Ricoeur is philosophically at odds) may be replete with problems but we do 
ourselves a disservice, Ricoeur maintains, if we convince ourselves that the positivist's 
naivete is reason to withhold responsibility from those who have passed before us. 
12 
Positivist criticism, at least, expresses an enduring concern for the status of the document 
and its relationship to the past. What is pragmatically necessary in the positivist 
illusion—the illusion that all assertions can be proven scientifically and/or empirically 
(OED)—is its faithfulness to a relationship between evidence and its past, regardless of 
how strained or tenuous that relationship reveals itself to be. Forensic science offers a 
positivistic reading of historical interpretation in so far as it interprets what happened at a 
given time and space, and the rhetorical textualization and subjectivization of physical 
remains calcifies the relationship between the dead and the physical document and the 
interpretative outcome. It is on this note that Antoinette Burton in "Archive Fever, 
Archive Stories" (2005), explains that the rising popularity of forensic science indexes a 
renewed interest in documents whose material fixity remain intact. "Indeed, the most 
popular archive stories of the new millennium are shaped by the belief in the capacity of 
material evidence to create and sustain tests of verifiability" (Burton 5). Burton notes in 
particular the effervescent interest in forensic science, which has become a site of 
"sacralization" and "renewed faith in the capacity of science to read certain types of 
archives (corpses, crime scenes, DNA samples" (5). Therefore, the alibi of 'victim 
testimony,' which conceals the interpretative dimensions of scientific investigations, 
reiterates the axiomatic layer that subtends positivist criticism. Simultaneously obscuring 
and rendering transparent the interpretative intervention and reiterating the physical 
trace's capacity to 'stand in' for the dead, our tropology figuratively articulates a sense of 
indebtedness towards the dead through the ex-nomination of the scientist made possible 
by the subjectivization of the evidential body. Therefore, in representations of forensic 
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science the textualization of the body coincides and is bolstered by the positivistic 
epistemological stance. If the body is a text, paradoxically, it is also because it isn't one. 
These trends, however, have wide implications; and, they raise more questions 
than they answer. The rhetorical textualization of the bodily trace, even if it allows for a 
sense of obligation towards the dead, is nevertheless based on a positivist naivete and 
what is more, the distinctly semiological bias at the heart of the rhetorical extension of 
subjectivity, raises additional questions about the ethical issues that subtend that semiotic 
model implicitely upheld in their analogy. The textualization of the body and/or material 
world is an ethical issue that haunts humanities scholarship as much as it does the human 
rights. The discourse of rights is also creeping into our arguments for a return to 
materiality within the humanities. Consider Archaeologist Bj<|>rnor Olsen's argument for 
a'return to things': 
Archaeologists should unite in defence of things, a defence of those subaltern members of 
the collective that have been silenced and "othered" by the imperialist social and 
humanist discourses. I am tired of the familiar story of how the subject, the social, the 
episteme, created the object; tired of the story that everything is language, action, mind 
and human bodies. I want us to pay attention to the other half of this story: how objects 
construct the subject. This story is not narrated in the labile languages, but comes to us 
silent, tangible, visible and brute material remains [...] Thus, the need for a new regime, 
"a democracy extended to things" (Latour), becomes ever more evident. (Olsen qtd. in 
Domanska341) 
The postmodernist claim that the body is a text evidently bears ethical implications, as 
Olsen's comment suggests, but so too as Ewa Domanksa correctly points out, does the 
extension of ethical rights to material objects (341). It is impossible to disassociate the 
extension of human rights discourse to human remains from the debates held internally 
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within academia because in a very real way their rhetoric is also ours. What our tropic 
drift confronts us with is how distinctly thorny the category of the material trace is for us 
today as is the wayward cultural tick of representing the semiotic process in terms of 
intentionality. In addition, it underlines the central importance physical documentation to 
our sense of connection and indebtedness to the dead and our ability to represent the 
events they endured in the present. The Dingpolitik, what Bruno Latour calls a politics 
formed around a given object or material good, is unquestionably at our door. 
Trajectory of the Text 
Traces, Testimony, Paranoia surveys modalities of signification related to the 
interpretation of human remains and physical traces. Drawing inspiration from the 
reports and dramatic representations of the forensic investigative process, as well as the 
scholarly literature on material traces, it selects and organizes from among them the 
stories we inadvertently tell ourselves about indexical signs and takes these as points of 
departure for further theoretical consideration and revision. This work, therefore, 
develops from the implicit argument that if physical traces inspire discernible and 
recurrent tropes (such as the one discussed above) they, as a coherent assemblage of 
rhetorical figures and literary devices, provide important insight into their semiotic 
nature. The methodological principle driving this entire analysis is based on the 
assumption that tropes tell us a substantial amount about how we conceive and account 
for the meaning of indices and how we think they might differ formally and substantially 
from the other types of evidence we encounter. How material evidence signifies is a 
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process we love to describe and demonstrate to ourselves time and time again. Detective 
novels, forensic television dramas, documentaries on the subject of archaeological and 
anthropological digs, guided tours through a museum exhibit, rites of circumcision, mass 
pilgrimages to the site of a relic, each of these is a part of what together make up what 
could be described as the dramaturgy of the trace. Dramaturgy, for those of us that need 
reminding, is defined as "the theory and practice of dramatic composition" (OED), with 
drama, of course, denoting at once an instance of dramatization and a series of rousing 
events or circumstances. The ritualistic re-enactments and/or representations of the 
semiotic encounter within the field of human rights are dramatizations in their own right; 
they consist of a shared means for us to simulate and reinforce the trace's importance and 
value historically and politically. What is more, these practices are dramaturgical to the 
extent that they account for a significant portion of semiotic theory. Put simply, any 
theory is "a set of principles" upon which we rely to explain a phenomenon and to justify 
our interventions with regard to it (OED), and prejudice alone dictates that it is 
transmitted only in the form of textbooks, scholarly articles or texts of Talmudic 
proportions. Because semiotic precepts are reiterated through the repetition of cultural 
rites, limiting theory to its explanatory function dangerously lifts it from the realm of 
anthropology and, worse, falsely impresses upon us the sense that the corpus of semiotic 
theory is integral while 'external' cultural practices are what change. 
The fact of the matter is that our ideas of how signs signify are in perpetual flux 
because the manners in which signs signify also evolve across time and space. For 
example, Byzantine doctrine supported the belief that iconographic depictions of the 
saints and disciples were marked with divine influence. Theirs was a theo-semiotic 
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theory pertaining to a class of visual images. The iconographic ornamentation of 
Byzantine churches and their place in prayer rituals is partly a consequence of their 
semiotic (and therefore social) function as mediators of the divine. Or consider, for 
instance, the recent controversy surrounding the Danish cartoons of the Islamic prophet 
Mohammed: the confrontation would have been very different if sacrilege were not 
intimately bound to figurative representation of the deity in the Islamic tradition. Perhaps 
it is too easy for us to grasp the political effectivity of semiotic systems and codes in 
circumstances such as these; it is easy to see how the Judaic and Christian traditions 
established dissimilar semiotic codes, which permeated culture at large.7 It becomes less 
obvious, it seems, to take note of their inception when they emerge out of the informal 
contexts of popular culture or human rights discourse because they are more insidiously 
ingrained in our cultural subconscious. What are we to make of the rise of narratives 
dealing with physical traces in forensic science, for example, and their lauded ability to 
extract infallible information from physical traces that 'come from the dead'? In as much 
as they reiterate semiotic commandments or innovate new ones, even the most popular or 
colloquial of texts merit our consideration as a site of theoretical innovation and 
regeneration. 
The anecdotal, the narratological and the dramatic do not necessarily lapse into 
the theoretical, but in the instance where they simulate, demonstrate or substantiate a 
semiotic event I want to argue that they are. Tropes relating to indexical signs, regardless 
of how they are recounted, are theoretical propositions overlaid with a poetic or literary 
veneer—their didactic and rhetorical edges softened by a canon of figures where desire 
7 See Julia Kristeva's The Powers of Horror (1982) for an excellent discussion of the semiotics of the 
abject in Christianity and Judaism. 
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and the imagination linger and are replenished. If our goal is to gain insight into how 
physical signs signify, how they come to mean what they mean, and, if we broaden and 
complicate what counts as primary and secondary sources and what counts as a story, 
then everything from journalistic reports to the digitized illustrations which are a staple of 
forensic science televisual dramas are suitable fodder for exploration. They, like our 
canon of critical theory, offer a privileged view of the epistemological and ontological 
assumptions we communally share with regard to indexical signs and, on that account, 
may potentially incite alterations and revisions in our own academic work. 
Traces, Testimony, Paranoia, accordingly, grounds itself on source-based 
research and analysis. It works from pre-existing theoretical material and adds to this 
repertoire of established scholarly work, news reports and popular fictional and 
nonfictional works that advertise a preoccupation with physical traces and the 
recuperation of human remains for human rights purposes. The objective here is not to 
produce a hermetic theory of the index or trace—one that would seal inconsistencies or 
gloss over points of contradiction—rather, in resisting the lure of hermeticism, the 
implicit goal is to flesh out the semiotic richness traces were hitherto denied. We already 
observed how the textualization of the body supports the illusions of positivism, how it 
transformed the corpse into an communicative subjective agent; this work gambles that 
this is not only rhetoric but is part of the phantasmagoric and theoretical makeup always 
already greeting and shaping the semiotics of the physical trace. Because the trace is 
under theorized and because it doesn't easily fit within the representational bias of 
semiology, our theories of the trace are likely predestined to be phantasmatic as well. 
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Chapter One "The Anatomy of the Anecdote" is a genealogical effort to 
substantiate the analogy between testimony and trace. In other words, I open with a 
discussion of the metaphorical extension and conflation of physical traces with other 
forms of inscription as it relates to the latter's testimonial function. Citing the 
widespread habit of equating writing and organic signs with one another in the human 
rights domain and elsewhere in humanities scholarship, I follow the self-same impulse 
across the works of Paul Riceour, Jacques Derrida and lesser-known but recent scholars 
who are grappling with the status of material signs. Mapping out the metaphorical, and 
therefore, relational origins of their equivalence, this chapter responds to and resists the 
rhetorical effectivity of the trope itself by drawing out the way in which they are at odds 
and, ultimately, how they are incommensurable. And, reaching for the work of 
philosopher Alphonso Lingis, I finally highlight the issues, ethical and theoretical, that 
are elided in the linguisticism upheld by the analogy of trace and testimony. 
Whereas Chapter One is essentially angled along the issue of identification. 
Chapter Two "Traces qua Index" further deconstructs the identity between trace and 
testimony. In the course of this chapter, I draw out their differences by reading the trace 
against Charles Sanders Peirce's theory of the index. However, the question of why their 
identification persists—why linguistic meaning is continually projected onto non-
linguistic signs—is explained through an application of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory. 
A Lacanian reading of the trace not only offers compelling explanations for the 
consubstantiation of sign and trace, but also reinforces how the meaning and significance 
we give to traces and remains are not immune to psycho-semiotic influences. In fact, the 
status of the trace as a meaning-full sign akin to linguistic signs is a by-product of the 
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human being's configuration as a subject of language and desire. Chapter Two, then, 
reads our anthropomorphism and linguisticism in light of Lacan's theory of the imaginary 
imagos. 
Chapter Three "The Way of the Anecdote" returns to the question of the 
testimonial function of trace. While this penultimate chapter implicitly stands as an 
argument for greater attention to physical traces within the field of literary theory, 
explicitly it situates the will to narrative and testimony—in essence, the inauguration of a 
text—with the formal properties of the sign. Drawing on Paul Ricoeur, Charles Sanders 
Peirce, Susan Stewart and Joel Fineman, I argue that abductive indices force the 
verbalization of cross-temporal contiguity and consequently, constitute a formal 
constraint upon the semiotician/orator to rely on narrative. Furthermore, this chapter 
suggests that material traces motivate a particular narrational form, namely the medico-
legal anecdote, and further suggests that this might explain why the corpus dilecti of our 
forensic protagonists is being promoted as a site of narration. 
"Closing Thoughts: Aggressivity and Paranoia" is the concluding chapter in 
which I discuss the theoretical and ethical questions the previous chapters bring to a 
discussion of human rights and our culture "of commiseration" (Seltzer). My concern is 
that the introduction of forensics to human rights discourse might normalize and institute 
a paranoiac subjectivity and, additionally, that the accent placed on identification in the 
act of witnessing raises the problem of imaginary aggressivity at the heart of rights 
discourse. More cautionary than prescriptive, our conclusion leaves with questions we 
should ask ourselves as we anticipate the effects forensics will concretely bring to human 
rights discourse and the symbolic rehabiliation of traumatic experiences. 
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To better follow the forthcoming discussion, however, it behoves the reader to 
read through a brief historical overview of the field of semiotics. 
Thinking Through the Semiological Bias 
If the attribution of intentional communication to physical evidence poses a complication 
it is because it accosts us with the theoretical glitches, conceptual confusion and 
oversights that follow from the alleged bipolarity in the field of semiotics itself. Physical 
markings readily interpellate both traditions but are faithful to neither. At once material 
and conceptual, motivated and conventional, potentially intentional or not, the material 
trace straddles both continental semiology and American semeiotics; and various, usually 
implicit conceptions of signs and their relationship to language, empirical reality, 
subjectivity and culture account for how a physical trace is approached and understood. 
Indeed, the texualization of physical trauma in the instance of forensic science is rooted 
in a matrix of rhetorical and historical articulations and its paradoxical (from a semiotic 
perspective at least) reliance on textual metaphors to describe and reiterate positivist 
maxims is a semiotic enigma. The rhetoric of textuality inscribes the physical trace 
within differing and seemingly incommensurable "regimes of signs" (Deleuze and 
Guattari), the physical trace is formally dissonant with semiology and yet, here they 
coexist. If we can readily recognize the rhetorical uses of semiological topographies, it is 
another challenge to infer from these rhetorical detours the conscious and unconscious 
fantasies we have about material signs themselves. The first step before actually 
commencing such an inquiry is to understand the historical evolution of the 
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field/discipline of semiotics. Finally, because histories of semiotics abound and I see no 
reason to subject the reader to a lecture he or she has heard several times before, the 
following review is angled along the question of the material sign because it relates 
directly with the topical dimensions of the work. 
Goren Sonnessan makes the convincing argument that the field of semiotics is not 
only heir to Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Sanders Pierce and more, that even if this 
were the case, it never led to the conquest of the Peircian tradition to the benefit of the 
linguistic tradition (Sonnessan "Fallacy"). However, setting momentarily aside the 
'linguistic fallacy' which Sonessan alleges falsely orients histories of semiotics, and also 
acquiescing that the fault lies with the lamentable indifference of American scholarship to 
Scandinavian contributions to the field of semiotics, the fact of the matter remains that 
the American history of semiotics is worth reiterating if only because it is the projected 
interpretation of the past that has shaped scholarly discourse since. Sonnessan's 
interjection notwithstanding, usually the origins of modern semiotics are cast back to two 
male figures: Charles Sanders Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure. Peirce titled his 
philosophically grounded study of signs semeiotics; whereas de Saussure's linguistically 
inflected study took on the title of semiology. While the Peircian model emerged out of 
nineteenth-century American pragmatism, the Saussurean tradition was born out of 
continental linguistics. Though it is debatable whether or not the models are mutually 
exclusive, it is, without a doubt difficult to understand one model in terms of the other 
without straining their analogy or, at the very least, failing to note that each model is 
suited to certain inquiries and not others. From the vantage point of Saussurean 
semiology signification itself became a privileged index of sociological, ideological, 
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psychoanalytic and political determinations, whereas the Peircian model, though 
impenetrable and under-developed, has shown to be more inclined towards questions of 
ethics. 
The Saussurean model if not condemned outright for its anthropocentrism and 
glottocentrism is cast-backhandedly as a restrictive model whenever, it seems, the 
opportunity arises and that may well be a better index of its influence and popularity than 
it is its shortcomings. Saussure in Course in General Linguistics (1916) envisioned 
linguistics as a part of semiology but in spite of situating linguistics as a portion of a 
larger science, his work came to the part that eventually coloured the whole. "Linguistics 
would serve as example of its basic concepts be applied to other domains of social and 
cultural life" (Culler 22). The linguistic bias at the heart of semiology became 
particularly evident when attempts were made to expand the practice to signifying 
systems that relied on material phenomena. Consider Roland Barthes, who, in Elements 
of Semiology (1964), sought to expand the influence Saussurean linguistics. In so doing, 
Barthes suggested that we invert the relation between linguistics and semiology as 
posited by Saussure before him. "In fact, we must now face the possibility of inverting 
Saussure's declaration: linguistics is not a part of the general science of signs, even a 
privileged part, it is semiology which is a part of linguistics: to be precise, it is that part 
covering the great signifying unites of discourse" (11, italics in original). Barthes' 
experiment, though, meant that 'non-linguistic' objects were subjected to linguistic 
analysis. The consequence, of course, was that since Saussure's linguistic model could 
validly be taken as a model for semiology generally, the primacy of language and 
discourse was augmented. The political ramifications of this approach are wide and, 
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without a doubt, it has deserved the popularity; nonetheless, general complaints voiced by 
those who follow Charles Sanders Peirce's philosophy rightly push us to recognize the 
'social' bias, the lingua-centrism that inheres within this methodology. Even if Barthes' 
could identify the "garment system' or the "furniture system" (Barthes Elements 63), 
these systems were still explained through the lens of a semiology modeled on linguistics, 
and as such, were interesting precisely because they were conducive to it. These systems 
were cultural. Of course, Barthes too recognized the potential limitations of his approach 
(though there is no reason to suspect, at this point in his career, that Barthes would have 
been unsatisfied with the anthropocentric leanings of his semiology because his 
disillusion with structuralist semiology only touched him in his later years): 
And indeed it must be acknowledged in advance that such an investigation is both diffident and 
rash: diffident because semiological knowledge at present can only be a copy of linguistic 
knowledge; rash, because this knowledge must be applied forthwith, at least, as a project to non-
linguistic objects. (Barthes Elements 11) 
What we find in Saussure's disciplinary positioning and in Barthes' caveats is 
ambivalence with regard to the nature of semiological analysis and the merits of its ties to 
linguistics—and, more importantly, we already see the specter of a non-linguistic object 
and a method appropriate to it haunting its development. The latter has identified 
semiology by a relation of negativity. What does it mean to have semiology modeled 
upon language? It means, first and foremost, that the parameters are strictly drawn 
around and determined by social and cultural systems of exchange and meaning. 
Semiology is self-avowedly anthropocentric. Indeed, even when indexicality and 
iconicity enter the fray of continental semiology, they are often propped awkwardly 
alongside Saussure's schema; they become self-contained units divorced somehow from 
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Peirce's general theory of signs. Indeed, if non-linguistic phenomena were the structure 
of difference, the structuring and constitutive opposition term to the semiological 
enterprise, some philosophers have gone so far as to describe this structural dismissal 
within psychoanalytic terms. Elizabeth Grosz recently called, in Time Travels (2005), on 
scholars to "overturn the repression of materiality in its most complex forms that has 
dominated the humanities and social sciences in their exclusive focus on cultural 
construction at the expense of natural production" (44). 
Where Barthes carried Saussure into realms previously considered non-linguistic 
only to show how everything could potentially be considered a form of speech (Barthes 
Mythologies 109), the American tradition situates continental semiology within an even 
larger field of study. Broadly speaking, to those sympathetic with Thomas Sebeok's 
perspectives (Peirce sympathizer), intentionality is not a pre-requisite to semiotics, as is 
language, as is culture. Sebeok writes, "Semiotics is further concerned with two sets of 
interrelated historical problems: the course of development of appropriate mechanisms 
for processing messages by individual organisms in ontogenesis; and the evolution of 
such mechanisms in a species of phylogenesis'''' ("Communication" 22, italics in 
original). When so wide a net is being cast, semiology dwindles in proportion; if 
semiology is culture, semiotics is life. For Petrelli and Augusto Ponzios the expanded 
definition of semiotics constitutes an opening for a semioethics: a sense of responsibility 
born of an understanding of the semiosis of life: "the implication is not just human life, 
but all of life throughout the entire planetary ecosystem, from which human life cannot 
separate" (Petrelli 534). Recalling arguments previously made my Sebeok, it is Peirce's 
tradition (and others deemed compatible with it, such as Mikhail Bahktin's) that brings to 
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awareness the interconnectivity among life forms through semiosis. Petrelli and Ponzios 
present a world where interpretant informs interpretant ad infinitum, where every living 
organism is defined not as a separate entity from every other, but rather constituted 
through flows of intercorporeality, interdependency that defy the "private, static, 
conceptions of the body" (539) reinforced by the division of the sciences. Petrelli and 
Ponzios 'semioethics' is interesting because one finds that all the values of 
poststructuralism—the decentered subject, subjectivity as a semiotic achievement, 
individual as dialogical—finds a metaphorical ally in the inertia of a global semiotics. "If 
nothing else (global semiotics), can counter with a whole series of signs showing how 
each instant of individual life is interrelated to all other forms of life over the entire 
planet" (558). It is as though a reading of biosemiosis would reveal the imaginary 
structure of our ontological presuppositions, where the human subject, as reformulated 
through theories of dialogism, would rediscover a sort of ontological symbiosis with the 
world.8 As Peter van Wyck explains, commenting on ecological thought, "once we say 
that everything is connected in this fashion, we mean this in the sense that everything is, 
if not already, then at least potentially integrated into a framework of understanding. And 
it isn't" (viii, ix). The same could be said of semiotics. Our understanding of non-
linguistic signs and global semiosis is still premature even if we have a cosmic order 
proving their salience. 
The fact of the matter is: the extra-linguistic, often spoken in terms of matter, is a 
problem and an unrelenting one at that. For semiology, materiality is a loss, an aborted 
Petrelli and Ponzio unjustly ignore the role semiology (in the tradition of Saussure) has had on 
subjectivity, but they are able to account for this omission by assembling an impressive review of Peirce, 
Welby, Bakhtin and Levinas to present a semiotics of subjectivity that is consistent with the "American' 
orientation of their work and yet, recalls the advances of the Europeans. In any case, it has one wonder 
suddenly how antithetical these two traditions may, in fact, be. 
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failure on the part of signification and the discipline itself. Language seemingly expulses 
matter even as it appropriates it in order to signify.9 Because meaning is constructed 
through a "non-phenomenal structure of differences", Judith Butler writes, whatever 
meaning we ascribe to material objects must go through the detour of that structure (67-
73). Even 'the general science' intuited by Saussure gets eclipsed, becoming instead a 
constitutive residue resisting sublimation and incorporation within the field. With 
American semiotics, we face instead a discipline predominantly centered on material 
signifiers that are neither arbitrarily related to the signified or linguistic, and whose recent 
forays into the themes of ethics, responsibility and subjectivity are so incredible in scope, 
one feels engulfed in a process too large to conceptualize or respond to adequately. If the 
tale of semiology is one of struggling to (re)capture the loss that it simultaneously 
occasions and secures (Butler 69), the tale of (indexical) semiosis is conversely one of 
being captured and drawn to 'natural' signs and trying to account for it. 
As this cursory overview of the field of semiotics suggests, the question of 
materiality in signification is a persistently thorny issue. Either materiality is textual or, 
if it is not, nothing or little of substantial use can otherwise be said about it. Similarly, 
the consequences of a distinctly poststructuralist preoccupation with the textuality of 
materiality have ended up frustrating countless scholars, such that many obviate the 
question altogether or mention the delusions of the high theorists to plug the merits of 
their comparatively grounded work. As we shall see in the following chapter, the 
9 
See Judith Butler's Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (1993') for an excellent 
discussion of the materiality of the signifier through which we reference a pure materiality. It is through 
non-phenomenal detours that we can have material signs signify. Thus, even though language has a 
materiality is can only signify because of structures of differentiation. (67-73) What Butler does not 
address, however, are the question 'non-arbitrary' signifiers, which are those introduced to us by Peirce. 
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challenges and resistences posed by the semiotics of the material trace are felt even as 
scientists and scholars find reason to identify textuality with materiality with one another. 
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Chapter One: The Anatomy of an Analogy 
Contemplating bodily texts is not so esoteric or inconsequential as some would suspect. 
In recent decades, for example, we have come to think of the body as a site upon which 
culture inscribes itself and so, the question of what is or is not writing and what counts or 
not as testimony is not without interest or without its own set of hurdles. For one, 
thinking of the body as passive and culture as active reinforces binaries that preclude 
thinking differently about our relationship to the world outside of their terms; but, on the 
other hand, the metaphor of culture-as-scribe is a compelling one for philosophers of the 
trace because markings on the skin or wounds acquired throughout one's life are, as Mark 
Seltzer intimates, the meeting place of history and body ("The Crime System" 572). The 
fact of the body's capacity to accumulate scars and to turn itself into a surface for 
inscription, an organic and signifying tabula rasa, crosses over to and colours our 
elementary understandings of the trace. Markings on the skin are not the same as the skin 
itself; the former is a disruption, an external break to the integrity of the epidermis and so 
also marks the difference of figure and ground. 
In Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression (1995), Jacques Derrida embraces the 
analogy between the printing press and the rite of male circumcision in Jewish culture, 
asking us to broaden our definition of what counts as an inscription and what counts as 
archive. "Less typographical than the first [writing], as we said, it [the circumcision] 
nonetheless still maintains a reference to the graphic mark and to repetition, indeed to 
printing of the typical sort" (Derrida Archive 20). Traces found on bodies are of the 
same nature as inscriptions, but does that also mean that we should think of them as 
forms of writing? Is it fair that wounds, bullet holes and other lacerations to the body 
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still resonate in our mind with words inscribed on a tablet? The question evidently 
touches upon the merits of reasoning through tropic means, whether metaphorical 
thinking is enough for us, and, if so, what value it holds to our understanding of the 
semiotics of the trace specifically as it appears in the changing rhetoric of human rights. 
The metaphorical extension of writing and reading, like testimony, to all modes of 
interpretation generally—the idea that writing and reading are somehow involved or 
serve as apt metaphors indiscriminate of the hermeneutic exercise—confuses the 
epistemological and ontological specificities of the trace. If vestiges of the past and scars 
are a potential form of testimony, then what, we may ask, is lost in their conflation? Isn't 
the semantic transference of testimony to inscription the product of a confusing complex 
of analogies that controvert the differences between them? Thinking through the 
testimonial and typographical functions of physical traces, in this chapter I take the 
preoccupation of human rights advocates with physical traces as sound surrogates to 
eyewitness testimony, not as an anomaly, but as a drift with a precedent. However, rather 
than use antecedents and like-cases as a means to condone or naturalize their association, 
I wish to draw out the differences between trace and word that are refused by the 
machinations of identity. Specifically, I suggest that although the trace and testimony 
share a common ground, our impulse to establish a commonality between them occludes 
their differences and just as importantly, it reflects and subjects us to a theoretical and 
conceptual myopia characteristic of our western inheritance. 
The application of a metaphorics of writing and reading to the entirety of the 
historiographical operation makes sense when we confine ourselves to the conventional, 
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i.e., traditional, conceptions of what it is that historians do and how we come to know the 
past. The hermeneutic exercise—"the reading of texts that have drifted out of their 
original historical setting" (Peters 149)—is principally one of cross-temporal encounters 
with texts produced through human interference. The definition of what counts as a 
historically significant trace and the appropriate means to gather information about them 
are complicated when the traces left behind are not first or essentially a form of writing. 
When past events are inferred from unintentional physical markings and disturbances to 
the body proper, or when the identity of those partaking in the events are given to us 
through inherited characters such as bodily proportions and skeletal morphologies, the 
interpretative exercise is one that invariably moves us from symbolic texts to the 
proverbial 'text of the world'. In the documentation of human rights abuses, the recovery 
of historical accounts increasingly means the incorporation of forensic scientific modes 
of interpretation and an evolving body of criteria for what counts as historical evidence 
and what counts as testimony in the courts of law. As we broaden our definition of 
admissible documentation, however, the language indigenous to one paradigm is used to 
describe the other and the issue of textuality and intentional inscription is brought to 
centre stage. What is more, the dwindling authority of eyewitness testimony and the rise 
of forensic authority means that the stories we ultimately choose to represent the past are 
founded on the stories we tell ourselves about the validity of documentary evidence. 
While semioticians are accustomed to the idea that interpretation, be it of the solar 
system or a Chaim Potok novel, transforms the matter interpreted into a text, the 
movement from eyewitness testimony to testimonial markings brings with it a series of 
questions and issues that are uneasily explained away with arguments for pan-textualism. 
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It is not enough to explain these discursive, and therefore institutional, shifts with the 
commonplace observation that the body too can be a text. The issue is not whether pan-
textualism is relevant or accurate as an observation—it is, nor is it a question of 
dismissing what is now common knowledge within the humanities, the issue is that the 
textualization of the body inevitably brings with it a semiological bias that dodges the 
question of the interpretive process that is unique to the physical trace and the enduring 
hold it has on our cultural imaginary. Textual interpretation, even if it can apply both to 
non-intentional markings and literary works, is a broad and unwieldy category. For one, 
reiterating the fact of textuality in the semiotic encounter does not necessarily tell us 
whether we should also concede to the theory that the text, material or symbolic, is 
polysemic (Eco "Unlimited" 205). Indeed, even if textuality is extended to bodily 
markings, the reasons for our present interest in it, particularly in the field of human 
rights documentation, is not limited to our improved capacity to 'read' them, but also 
speaks to the belief that, unlike the eyewitness testimonies or the subjective 
interpretations of the witness account, the material deposits that are conducive to forensic 
investigation have a fixed and unalterable meaning—a stance that stands in direct 
opposition to what we have come to understand about meaning, signs and language. 
Therefore, we cannot fall for sloppy analogies between deconstructionist readings 
(arguably, as well, misreadings of deconstructionism) and the textualization of the body 
as we see it happening in the field of human rights. The institutional movement from one 
to the other, from word to trace, is not the result of a playful whim or from an 
epistemological awakening on the part of human rights activists to the textuality of the 
body; rather, it registers an anxiety about our capacity to know and faithfully reconstruct 
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the past to ourselves in the absence of survivors, as well as the latter's reputed proclivity 
to err when they do exist. The body and its material remains are the tangible promise that 
it is possible to have access to the past. It is with amazement and relief that we hear 
forensic scientists explain that "from one body part it was possible to determine that the 
owner was human, how tall he had been, and to estimate the sex, age at death, ethnic 
origin, body weight, patterns of locomotion [...] even possible indications of how he had 
earned his living" (Uberlacker 48). The resurgent interest in the corpse and the 
clandestine grave, if we follow official statements from forensic practitioners behind the 
promotional wave in human rights journals—is that material evidence is an antidote to 
the messiness of historical writing and interpretation (Burton; Snow; Stover). Not only 
could information previously inaccessible be within reach, but the epistemological 
framework and the fact that it was based on material evidence seemingly sets it apart 
from the indeterminacies that taint eyewitness testimonies (Ricoeur). Clyde Snow, 
commenting on the purpose of forensic investigation of clandestine graves in Vokuvar, 
Croatia, explains: 
If justice must fall victim to history, however, forensic anthropologists can at least help 
make sure that the historical record is correct. Fifty years from now, people in the former 
Yugoslavia may try to repeat their predecessors' mistakes, as revisionists assert that 
ethnic cleansing and mass executions never took place. [...] It is pretty hard, I have found, 
to argue against a skull with a bullet in it. (Snow "Murder" 25) 
Snow's statement peddles several assumptions about the physical trace's persuasive 
capacity and its uses to human rights investigations and the historical record, not least 
surprising is the assumption that exposure to solid scientific evidence will prevent future 
mass crimes. However, the significant presupposition embedded therein is the belief 
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"that it is hard to argue against a skull with a bullet in it." The idea that forensically 
treated evidence will stand up to scrutiny is proportionate to the dwindling authority of 
eyewitness testimony among the scientific and juridical communities (Ricoeur) and the 
enduring authority of science. However, rhetoricians know too well the vulnerability of 
rational argument before other modes of persuasion in the public arena; there are no 
guarantees that where it is countered by dissonant worldviews that rational argument will 
be the victor. Indeed, already there are signs that in communities where scientific 
conclusions contradict deep-seated narratives, the contradictory evidence brought forth 
before human rights tribunals is denied and discounted by interested 'revisionists'. 
Ironically, it was in Kosovo in 2007, not far from Vokuvar, Croatia where Dr. Clyde 
Snow was once excavating mass graves allegedly created by the Serbian forces under 
Slobodan Milosevic that other forensic factions like the Canadian Forensic Team are 
casting doubt on the genocide numbers presented at the war-crimes trials in den Haag, 
Netherlands. 
Serbian forces under Milosevic are accused of ethnic cleansing on a scale between 
100,000 and 200,000 civilians (Martin 1), but individuals such as Vancouver Homicide 
detective Brian Honeybourn, filmmaker Garth Pritchard with the assistance of the 
Canadian Forensic Team are expressing serious doubts about the accuracy of these 
numbers. Quoted in Lawrence Martin's article in The Globe and Mail "Kosovo: Another 
Case of Mass Deception?" (2004), Garth Pritchard describes the reaction of Ms. Louise 
Arbour, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to news of the lack of 
forensic evidence. "I was standing there when the forensic teams were telling Louise 
Arbour there were no 200,000 bodies and she didn't want to know" (qtd. in Martin 1). 
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There's no guarantee that where scientists and scientific knowledge contradicts deep-
seated historical narratives, that the proverbial bullet will bear more weight than 
eyewitness testimonies or entrenched socio-cultural ideas of historical progression. Even 
if, as Clea Koff writes: "in places where government or military propaganda continually 
denies that certain people were killed, the exposure of graves and the analysis of remains 
refutes the "official story" (72), it is never certain that those who uphold the official story 
will accept the refutation. Therefore, the idea expounded by forensic scientists and 
optimistic human rights advocates that solid forensic evidence will solve historical 
disputes, lead to fairer jurisprudence and even, prevent future criminal actions is one that 
can only be upheld and embraced if we a priori separate and exempt it from those other 
rituals, procedures that buttress the persuasive appeal evidence is presumed to 
intrinsically possess. At a more fundamental level, however, it overdetermines physical 
traces with expectations of accuracy, infallibility and interpretative certainty when the 
relationship between the trace, the interpreting mind and discourse is much more 
complicated. 
A tension clearly exists in the public presentation of forensic investigations. First, 
we have informational signs that can be reliably interpreted because they differ in kind 
from typographical signs, and secondly, can be taken as reliable and faithful substitutes to 
them because they are analogous to one another in some respects. The textuality of the 
body carries more weight than the text of the witness because it is not, at heart, a text. 
The analogy drawn between testimony and wound is one that follows their difference and 
the semantic overlap that occurs undeniably bleeds into latent mythologies about the 
nature of physical traces and the fantasy that is communication (Gunn; Peters). But 
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philosophers and semioticians corroborate the analogy as well. It is important to look to 
the theoretical underpinnings that support the rhetorical extension of testimony to traces 
and untangle the ontological confusion that results from this linguistic and or 
epistemological act of transfer. 
In "The Material Presence of the Past" (2004), an article about the forensic excavation of 
the desaparecidos in Argentina, Ewa Domanska makes the point that the dead body is a 
"witness and evidence at the same time. It is also an alternative form of testimony" 
(344). Her observation is hardly controversial; it reiterates what is already argued by 
practicing forensic practitioners on a regular basis. The incessant conjunction of 
testimony and evidence, however, invites us to question whether or not an actual affinity 
exists between the two or whether we should discount it as a rhetorical convenience, a 
mere trope. If traumatic testimony can easily graft itself onto the wound, is it not because 
their analogy was already waiting—so to speak—for them? Jonathan Culler in The 
Pursuit of Signs: Semiotics. Literature. Deconstruction (1981) explains that a semiotic 
paradox inheres within the very notion of the rhetorical trope. The trope is a breach of 
contract; it registers the event of a deviation that turns against literal or denotational 
meaning. Tropes, we know, don't mean what they say. Not literally at least, and because 
they are transgressions of language (in order to use language for one's self one must also 
agree to its terms) these same deviations must be sufficiently codified as not to lead to 
incomprehensibility (Culler). "What looks at first like an inaugural creative act, a 
violation of the code, is accounted for by the formulation of a code on which its meaning 
is said to depend" (41). What this means is that the tropic drift from testimony to 
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physical mark was already established elsewhere, the connection or link was always 
already there. Here, it would register a historiographical code that would invite the 
equation of eyewitness testimony with forensic evidence. Indeed, Paul Ricoeur in 
Memory. History. Forgetting (2004) argues that a "dialectic of clue and testimony" (174) 
defines the very notion of the trace. 
Broadly defined, the trace is anything that tangibly indicates that something has 
passed or existed. In other words, traces are the deposits events and people leave behind. 
The marking signals a passing of something and so signifies, despite its static 
composition, the temporal and spatial dissonance at the heart of the semiotic encounter. 
"In fact, these remains are themselves what seem to be carriers of the signification 'past' 
(Ricoeur Time 121). Such is the definition of the trace Ricoeur offers in Vol. II of Time 
and Narrative (1986). but in Memory. History. Forgetting he affixes to this definition the 
trace's function as testimony. The question is why he does this? Or why this is the case? 
And what justifies its incorporation to the physical trace? Ricoeur contends that the 
notion of the trace semantically encapsulates a dialectical dynamic between testimony 
and evidence because the trace can be used either as a clue or testimonial. In reality, 
however, this is the compromise Ricoeur gives to a functional contradiction that emerges 
out of the secondary literature. The trace becomes an umbrella term that shelters within 
itself an answer to a problem made apparent through Riceour's close reading of Carlo 
Ginzberg and Marc Bloch. Whereas the latter equates all forms of evidence, be they 
intentionally discursive or not, with testimony, the former's theory of the evidential 
paradigm measures and describes the transformation of the trace into a clue. Ricoeur, 
facing these divergent readings of the trace, reconciles them by figuring the trace as the 
37 
root of them both: "the trace can be taken as the common root of testimony and clue" 
(Memory 175, emphasis mine). His reconfiguration of the notion of trace is the 
ontological compromise for two divergent semiotic dispositions. However, if he feels 
that the trace can artificially unite testimony and clue it is because, once again, they share 
an 'actual analogy'. The trace can encompass both the clue and the testimony because 
the clue is an imprint, and an imprint is similar to writing. "An animal passed by and left 
its track. This is a clue. But the clue by extension can be taken as a kind of writing 
inasmuch as the analogy of the imprint adheres originally to the evocation of striking a 
letter" (Memory 175). 
Like Derrida before him, Ricoeur compares the trace with the inscription made by 
the printing press, as though the act of engraving or pressing should be enough to conjoin 
arbitrary, intentional traces with and non-intentional ones. Ricoeur needs the trace to 
coincide with testimony in order to account for the transference of the semiotic function 
of the latter on the former. What this amounts to is that it is only through tropic means 
that we can relate them, again. Two etymological lines lead to our present conception of 
the trace, which registers two divergent definitions: a) the discursive inscription, which 
amounts to a textualization of the trace b) the clue, which bears a filial relation with the 
inferential logic of the hunter. In this way, Ricoeur's conception ties together and causes 
to overlap two contrasting semiotic dispositions, the arbitrary and the motivated, and 
therefore invites a heterological understanding of the physical trace. The trace is split: 
simultaneously linguistic and indexical. If we concede that the trace harbors opposing 
semiotic dispositions, it means that we also acknowledge that the status of the document 
is founded on this constitutive schism or a dialectic, then we may wonder what this 
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means concretely to the archival and historiographical operations of which forensic 
science is becoming a significant part. We need to resist the temptation, however, to 
choose one over the other, to expel the deviant, for both play an important part of the 
semiotic reality of the trace as we live it today. The schism embodies the capacity of a 
type of sign to be read and approached from different semiotic perspectives, themselves 
made possible in certain contexts and less so in others. The "semiotic production and 
reception of meaning" is historical (Hutcheon 378), and the semiotic dissonance at the 
heart of the trace speaks to the capacity of the motivated sign to attract at different times 
and spaces different interpretations and different assumptions about its role in 
interpretation. As Spiegel asks: "what is the past but a once material existence, now 
silenced, extant only as sign and as sign drawing to itself chains of conflicting 
interpretation that [...] compete for possession of the relics" (Spiegel 270)? 
The material remains under forensic scrutiny are signs of something past and 
while they are attracting differing interpretations (as clue and testimony) they are not so 
much in conflict as much as they appear to be complimentary; the investigative process is 
the mid-wife to testimony. So, although in strict philosophical or definitional terms the 
functional bifurcation of the trace would appear to constitute an insurmountable dialectic, 
as forensic practitioners are describing it, the dual status of clue and testimony is in 
dynamic even if it confuses the distinction between discourse and trace. Indeed, the 
dubious appropriateness of extending testimony to material clues might seem a matter of 
arguing semantics when documenting genocide is at stake. If history, as Ricoeur wrote in 
Time and Narrative, is ultimately about working in response to and for the dead, then the 
extension of testimony and voice to bits of hair and bone seems innocent enough. As 
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Koff writes about the excavation of the Rwandan landscape: "Even if we couldn't 
positively identify certain remains and return them to relatives, the remains would at least 
be able to speak in the collective voice of the victims of the Kibuye church massacre" 
(34). These sentences and images have poetic currency—for who doesn't warm to the 
idea of material remains recuperating lost narratives or lost appeals? Who doesn't feel 
seduced before the idea that immaterial secrets, historical certainty and the truth of past 
events are recoverable through material remains? 
The idea that the truth of testimony can be discerned through the scientific 
excavation of a grave, like a pilgrimage to the site of a violent event, is nothing new. 
There is a residual aura about the trace that appeals to a latent belief that a message is 
encapsulated in the physical confines of remains. "The site held so many secrets worth 
knowing," David Uberlacker writes, "so many stories that deserved telling, and so much 
information that informed our own culture as well as those we were studying—all 
brought back to life through the careful application of science and technology" (48). 
Vladimir Jankelevitch in La Mort (1977) explains that because the remains often left at 
our disposal are bodies, sites and objects, we see in them a means to compensate for what 
was lost and a means to decipher the significance of the event otherwise communicated to 
us through living testimony. Add to this scientific narratives of progress and the 
evidential paradigm (Ginzberg) regularly dramatized in detective fiction and belief is 
only heightened. But take a trip to Auschwitz, Jankelevitch writes, go to the gates of hell 
and you will come back empty handed because there is no message to be found. The 
truth resides with the living for it is the living alone that can communicate the singular 
truth of the event, who can relive it: "c'est la personne elle-meme qui porte temoignage" 
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(366). The message of the dead, he continues, was never relocated in space but because 
the metempirique is a constituent part of the empiricist fantasy, which is to say that what 
transcends or what doesn't properly belong to the evidential paradigm, has a way of 
finding its way back to it. Jankelevitch applies the metaphor of the microscope to this 
empiricist fantasy, an ultramicroscope that penetrates deeper and deeper, past the skin, to 
the chromosome, all the way to the genetic code. Here! The message! How is that 
different from Bergson, he asks, who imagined that memories, stories, were stored in the 
cerebral cortex, the tissue? "...aussi metaphorique qu'une geographie de memoire" (361-
362); as metaphorical as a geography of memory. The burrowed crevasses in Rwanda 
and Croatia are subject to this idolatrous treatment because they too harbor confessions, 
testimonies and lost narratives, and again they are twined to a fantasy of technological 
advancement: for were it not for the scientific and technological advances in the field of 
forensic science, we could not allow the dead to speak and an entire facet of historical 
knowledge would be beyond our reach. The story, so to speak, is out there in the body 
and grave. The truth does not lie so much with the forensic scientist but the material 
substrate, the marking itself. The projection of a narrative onto gravesites and the 
concomitant belief that with proper care the forensic scientist will 'get it right' and 
excavate the narrative as it was meant to be read, rhetorically equates the material trace as 
the source of the narrative. The forensic scientist doesn't see, or at least doesn't admit, 
that "there is no story there to be gotten straight" (Kellner 137), or that his intervention is 
precisely what textualizes the trace and therefore, transforms it into an intentionally 
signifying sign. Ultimately, this is what the transference of testimony onto bits of hair 
achieves: inflecting physical remains with a testimonial function—albeit a "testimony-
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despite-itself' (Bloch) also inflects them with those aspects of testimony that it cannot 
alone meet, namely the self-referential function of discourse (Ricoeur), the intention to 
communicate with the other, the interpersonal dynamic it instates. In other words, it 
excludes the self—unless, that is, it is reinstated artificially through the scientist as relay. 
There are sound reasons for ascribing intentionality to corpses when human rights 
documentation is at issue, but that doesn't take away the fact that the subjectivity that we 
are beholden to in eyewitness testimonies is displaced and perched vicariously between 
the bodily remains and the scientist. And while it is common parlance to state the human 
remains testify to the existence of the individual who once owned them, it is a basic 
semiotic principle that "for all practical purposes, indices cannot testify to the existence 
of their objects" (Sonnessan "Indexicality" 3). Traces cannot, on their own accord, 
testify to this much. Indeed, the past couldn't be "extant as sign" (Spiegel) if it couldn't 
also be used to lie (Eco Theory). The rhetorical maneuver, nonetheless, brings about an 
ontological change in the trace. For what is the movement from clue to testimony if not 
an incorporeal transformation brought about by forensic intervention? 
The trace is just a disturbance, not yet even a clue, before the practitioners speak 
to their testimonial value. And the incorporeal transformation is nothing other than the 
capacity of a statement to instantaneously bring about an ontological transformation to 
what it external to it. Deleuze and Guattari describe it as a leap in the same place (81); it 
is a change brought about by enunciation, by language, but "applies to" bodies. If the 
body as corpse is a repository of stories and memory, it is because it underwent an 
incorporeal transformation in the circumstances for a forensic investigation. No longer 
just a corpse, the body is a source of information and carrier of testimonies, and a place 
42 
where communication happens. This wasn't supposed to happen this way. The grave is 
clandestine, it wasn't intended as a historical archive of material testimonies. Nothing 
was supposed to happen here. The bodies were meant to be abandoned, and even if they 
were found, before the advent of forensic science on the scene of human rights 
investigations, these would not have consisted of archives, at least not to the international 
public. Survivors were the problem, the loose threads that could testify to the event. 
Forensics changed that. Clea Koff writes: "I was a graduate student in forensic 
anthropology, but I would have known for years that my goal was to help end human 
rights abuses by proving to would-be killers that bones could talk" (7). In other words, 
the message was to prove to killers that the clandestine graves they produced were 
incorporeally transformed from ruin, corpse, to archive. The mass grave was not 
intended as a lieux de memoire (Nora), it was supposed to remain an insignificant ruin. 
"What makes certain prehistoric, geographical, archaeological locations important as 
sites is often precisely what ought to exclude them from them being lieux de memoire: 
the absolute absence of a will to remember and, by way of compensation, the crushing 
weight imposed on them by time, science, and the dreams of men" (Nora 21). When the 
documentation of human rights are at issue, when the will to remember is so evidently 
expressed by interested factions and populations in mourning, the idea that the will to 
remember on the part of the victims of man-made mass death is not essentially embodied 
in their remains is a difficult one to accept—especially when the will to forget is so aptly 
represented in the criminals' attempts to cover up the traces of their actions. 
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Memory. Messages. Stories. Voice. These are the properties projected on physical 
inscriptions, each of which approximate and defer the character of oral testimony. One 
individual speaks to another through the ventriloquial medium of the forensic scientist 
(Connor). Common knowledge dictates that oral speech, unless recorded, leaves no 
residue or deposit (Ong 11), inscriptions however, do. There are nevertheless deposits 
that are non-communicative, which is not to say that they couldn't signify something or 
other to the human bystander who should happen to fall upon them. The corpse for 
instance, carries no intention nor do the scars on my stomach left behind by surgery. 
Animal tracks are not writing. Although tempting, Walter Ong in Orality and Literacy 
(1988) rightly cautions that to do so is to "trivialize" the very real difference between the 
two. "Notches on sticks and other aide-memoire lead up to writing, but they do not 
restructure the human lifeworld as true writing does" (82-84). Neither are notches on 
sticks testimonies, though they may second someone's testimony in court. Marc Bloch, 
as Ricoeur implies, could easily condense archival memory with testimony because he 
did not incorporate within his framework vestiges of the past (Memory 174-176). 
"However, there exist traces that are not 'written testimonies' and that are equally open to 
historical observation, namely 'vestiges of the past', which are the favorite target of 
archaeology: urns, tools, coins, painted or sculpted images, funerary objects, the remains 
of buildings, and so forth" (Ricoeur Memory 170). And bodies, DNA codes, vaginal 
fluids, sperm: these too are admissible for historical and juridical consideration; and 
again, they are not semiotic systems or communicative acts. 
Alphonso Lingis in Excesses: Eros and Culture (1983) distinguishes between 
historical and pre-historical inscriptions. While his object of study are the "savage 
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inscriptions"—the willful lacerations, punctures and piercing of the body within 
aboriginal culture—his musings nevertheless touch upon the dangers of attributing to all 
forms of inscription intentionality and expression. "What we are dealing with," he 
writes, "is inscription. 
Where writing graphics is not inscription on clay tablets, bark and papyrus, but in 
flesh and blood, and also where it is not historical, narrative" (23). 
Lingis ranks the savage inscription on the side of the pre-historical, meaning that the 
inscriptions on the body of the native are not, he claims, semiotic. This is different, for 
instance, from the tattoo, which in the West is purposefully communicative. The tattoo, 
though inscribed on the body proper, is very much an expression of the self and one's 
beliefs, social status and ranking; the inscriptions Lingis describes are of another kind 
altogether. Bereft of communicative intention, they operate on the level of pure action, 
release, a play on and across surfaces, and a libidinal surge that defies the propriety of 
boundaries. The savage inscription is a pure material disturbance to materiality, itself the 
effect of a release that stands prior to expression and communication, prior even to the 
signs. 
This is not yet a semiotic system. Yet it is out of this kind of distributive 
movement of inscription the differentiated material for a semiotic system will be 
taken, and on a purely lateral and libidinal function of craving and want that the 
intentional reference of signs will be developed. (38) 
Setting momentarily aside the question of libidinal cravings, Lingis' positioning of the 
bodily inscription on the savage body before the order of meaning is a compelling one for 
it marks a break with the semiological logic that obscures the means by which the 
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semiological field is born. In other words, in distinguishing the pre-ontology of the trace 
from the ontology of the trace-as-sign Lingis alerts us to the distinction between 
semiology and the possible processes, psychoanalytic or otherwise, that may have a role 
to play in the production and enjoyment of the trace without involving meaning. What 
this also brings to light is the arbitrary relationship between semiology and physical 
traces insofar as the projection of expression on the part of the Western individual to non-
intentional signs is culturally specific. It is not an inevitable projection but is, instead, a 
second-order semiotic encounter, one that superimposes itself onto an already existing 
relationship between man and trace that may or may not have anything to do with 
meaning or with hermeneutics. 
The analogy between eyewitness testimony and testimonial trace is a "play of 
sympathies" (Foucault The Order 26) that assimilates the one into the other and, through 
incorporeal transformation transforms the latter in the former through their identification. 
But, more significantly, the analogy established between the testimony and testimonial 
traces registers a semiological law, i.e. a cultural law that explains the relationship 
between signs across the material divide. The sympathy between eyewitness testimony 
and testimonial trace may be founded on the analogy between discursive inscription and 
non-intentional inscriptions, but the analogy nonetheless "transforms. It alters in the 
direction of identity" (Foucault 26) and so, the analogy between inscriptions becomes a 
guiding principle for the hermeneutic process. Establishing the relationship between 
signs across corporeal boundaries means that added to the process of reading and 
following clues is the need to anticipate beforehand the status of evidence as a form of 
testimony, as something which bears a grammatical relationship with oral witnessing. If 
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Lingis' meditation on the trace, and his proposition that the trace is pre-semiotic, 
contributes in any way to the problem of the trace's relationship to testimony it is to the 
awareness it raises to a unique bias within our own philosophical heritage to conceiving 
of all traces as forms of expression. This entrenched bias to conceive of bodily 
inscriptions as a form of expression is undoubtedly transferred with the extension of 
testimony to the physical inscription. For what, if not expression, is added to the field of 
the signified when disturbances to the material body are subjectivized? when voice is 
attributed to human remains? The projection of expression onto the trace is not inevitable 
(for there is nothing in the trace per se that would suggest that it should be equivalent to 
testimony) but in all evidence, there is a cultural tick, a cultural predisposition that 
equates one with the other. The tropic drift, so to speak, is seconded with the bias of 
semiology always already established within the Western imaginary. What is more, the 
semiological field that superimposes itself on the corpse or the clandestine grave is a 
projection, a production of meaning that works from the raw material of the physical 
trace. The play of sympathies premised on the alibi of semblance between printing press 
and inscription is the assimilating action that—as we shall see in the next chapter— 
conceals another process that lies precariously between the semiotic and the pre-semiotic, 
but which has no less a role to play in the relation between trace and interpreter. 
Semiology, as discussed earlier, conceives of the relationship between the plane 
of expression and the plane of content as arbitrary. The plane of expression (the trace 
itself) may remain the same, but the plane of content (that which it signifies) may change 
and shift beneath it. Convention alone dictates how the two are connected with each 
other. The kinship between intentional communication and non-intentional signification 
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established through the forensic turn within human rights discourse is one such instance 
of a conventional law that prescribes how signs are related to one another. The trace isn't 
just a clue, it is also something else—it is also a surrogate for testimony. But this 
necessarily complicates matters because the relationship between the plane of expression 
and the plane of content is not fully arbitrary with the trace. Because the trace is not 
writing, because it is not essentially discursive, the physical is not entirely the product of 
convention. Even in the instance where the trace is the product of human action, as 
would be the case with a bullet wound to the chest and would not therefore be considered 
a part of natural history as would skeletal proportions, the trace registers a disturbance 
that could be interpreted by someone who may not be a part of the murderer's culture. 
The trace is "a mark, object, or other indication of the existence or passing of something" 
(OED), and this passing is not indicated to the interpreter because we alone agree that it 
does. We recognize that our roommate ate cereal this morning because they left a milk-
soiled bowl on the counter. Similarly, the forensic scientist recognizes from the stage of 
decay of a corpse the probable time of death. The reason why this information can be 
gleaned from the trace is because, unlike pure writing, the plane of expression overlaps 
with the plane of content. 
It is at this point that we can safely introduce Charles Sanders Peirce's notion of indexical 
sign to the discussion because it is his work that most comprehensively addresses the 
formal properties that set the physical trace apart from conventional signs. While 
historians, scientists, medical practitioners and hunters have been interpreting traces since 
the beginning of time, Charles Sanders Peirce was the one who, observing the 
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hermeneutic process they implicate, came up with a semiotic theory that accounted for 
the difference between physical markings and other types of signs. Caring less about 
what was gleaned from the trace than how it was that information could be inferred from 
it, Peirce dedicated nearly a third of his theory of semiosis to the indexical sign. As 
Thomas Sebeok quoting Rulon Wells has pointed out "it is with his notion of index that 
Peirce is at once novel and fruitful" (Wells qtd. in Sebeok "Indexicality" 9). The 
following chapter commences with the merits of applying the notion of index to the 'turn 
to the trace' within human rights investigations and delves deeper into the space already 
opened up by Alphonso Lingis in Excesses and Carlo Ginzberg in "Clues: Morelli, Freud 
and Sherlock Holmes" (1983), namely the difference between the index and conventional 
signs and the logical and libidinal processes that independently and combined are 
constitutive of the trace's enduring hold on a re-emerging forensic culture. 
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Chapter Two: The Trace qua Index 
The inscription, then, the graphics? We proposed this work 
savages do on the material of their bodies from making 
signs, from expression. [...] All that is civilized, significant. 
Alphonso Lingis 
Were an index so interpreted, the mood must be imperative, 
or exclamatory, "See there!" or "Look out!" C. S. Peirce 
Even C. S. Peirce succumbed to quotation marks. Although his intent was clearly 
illustrative, it almost seems inevitable that the indexical sign should say something 
eventually. "See there!" "Look out!" Peirce, with the exception of this analogical slip, 
circumvented the impulse to ascribe intentionality to physical signs, reiterating instead 
that motivated signs such as indexes or icons "assert nothing" (Peirce 111), but that 
simple reminder might not always resonate because it is regularly muffled by the lure of 
anthropomorphism. Too often, it isn't enough that traces are significant; they have to say 
something meaningful. We should consider, however, that maybe some traces are not 
meant for us. It was suggested at the end of the previous chapter that the extension of 
testimony registered an anthropomorphic gesture of the kind lamented by Alphonso 
Lingis in Excesses: Eros and Culture (1983), suggesting that the extension of testimony 
to the trace is the product of an assimilation of non-intentional signs to the plane of 
intentionality—itself, Lingis reminds us, a knee-jerk reaction characteristic of the 
Western subject. The carefully placed caveat by Ricoeur via Bloch that traces might 
constitute "testimonies-despite-themselves" (Bloch) still leaves us in a precarious 
position and doesn't really avoid the problem since it still plays on a desire to figure the 
origins of testimony other than where it is. But what is noteworthy in Lingis' reading of 
the savage inscription is how it explicitly resists the impulse to project meaning onto 
everything; his reading is doubly radical since the traces he studies are anthropological. 
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That the scars purposefully marked across the savage body should not reflect the 'natural 
integrity' of the self that corresponds to the morphological integrity of the body, let alone 
signify nothing, is a stretch to the Western imagination. If human beings were the agents 
behind a trace, surely it must mean something to someone or another, and secondly, it 
must reflect the order of the world and not play havoc with the orderliness that we have 
already prescribed for it. Our forensic culture is not so different and more, we are faced 
with a varied typology of signs: some of the traces studied by forensic scientists belong 
to natural history, while the others are presumably from recent human history. Some of 
the signs are anthropological (machete wounds, bullet holes, a button), but others are 
natural (a molar tooth, the shape of the cranium, the length of a femur bone). However, 
in both circumstances, we never stray very far from our andocentricity. The latter are 
usually invoked in the service of the former, meaning that they are never really divested 
of humanist values. The relics of natural history work towards the identification of 
bodies that populate a grave, making it such that natural history revivifies the historical 
subject. Darwinian influence has yet to dissolve subjectivity—here, it seemingly returns 
the symbolic back to the deceased and those who mourn them. 
But putting aside the conservative and recuperative functions of forensic 
interpretation to the symbolic afterlife of the subject, where are we to locate meaning in 
all of this? Where does semiosis end (an evolutionary process), and the semiological (a 
cultural phenomenon) begin? What is it about indexical semiosis that makes itself 
conducive to anthropomorphic readings, and further, allows for the hierarchical 
reorganization between it an oral testimony? This chapter and the next are dedicated to 
these questions. Whereas the forthcoming chapter "The Way of the Anecdote" deals 
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specifically with the testimonial function of the trace and how it relates or compares to 
oral testimony, the present chapter deals specifically with the anthropomorphism that 
reinforces and subtends the analogy forged between them. First, however, a detour is 
needed to explain what semiotic properties the trace (qua index) does possess and how 
they compare to conventional signs. Doing so will allow for a clearer understanding of 
how and why anthropomorphism sets in. 
In other words, this chapter formally repeats the paradox, or the schism, which 
Paul Ricoeur locates at the heart of the etymology of the trace, with the inscription on the 
one hand and the clue on the other; but my intention is to repeat it with a difference. 
Rather than repeat their analogy, I first introduce the indexical sign as it is theorized and 
discussed by Charles Sanders Peirce and his followers and afterwards look to Lacanian 
psychoanalysis to account for the anthropomorphic tick that seems to colour our 
epistemological biases. In this way, I hope to step out of the confines of Ricoeur's and 
Derrida's analogical reasoning, and, by turning to psychoanalysis, locate the lure of the 
trace and its consequences on our epistemic stance. The first part of this chapter reviews 
the academic literature surrounding the indexical sign a) term often used interchangeably 
with the notion of trace) in an effort to underline an already existing theory of semiotics 
that is not culturally determined. My principle intention in doing so is to say that the 
index qua trace must be thought of as an event. The second part of the chapter turns to 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and theorizes the event of the indexical encounter through 
Jacques Lacan's Ecrits, namely "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the / Function" 
(1949), "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis" (1948), "On a Question Prior to Any Possible 
Treatment in Psychosis" (1955-56), as well as his third seminar The Psychoses 1955-
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1956. Both of these Lacanian psychoanalytic contributions will help us think through the 
event of coming across a trace and the problem of the projection of meaning. Further, I 
ask how it figures against the linguacentricity that caracterizes the analogical reading 
which both Riceour and Derrida had adopted and was outlined in the last chapter. What 
is more, we will then be able to grasp where the indexical event that is the trace figures 
against and within language and the symbolic generally. Only once we successfully iron 
out these issues can we finally unpack the precise ways in which the trace is veritably tied 
to testimony. 
The notion of index is often used interchangeably with the notion of trace. In many 
respects their conflation is not entirely misleading but in other respects it can lead to 
some confusion. If the intended purpose is to draw a faithful account of C. S. Peirce's 
theory of the index, the effect can be disastrous because it encourages an extremely 
narrow understanding of the contribution his theory of the indexical sign brought to 
sem(e)iotics. When the notion of trace and index are used synonymously usually it is 
founded on a very sound intuition, which is that traces are emblematic of indexes. But 
while the notion of trace is covered, or accounted for, by the notion of index, the 
definition of the index—as it is defined by C. S. Peirce—is much broader and for that 
reason cannot be reduced to traces. The trace is defined as a "mark, object, or other 
indication of the existence or passing of something" (OED), whereas the index as it is 
most commonly defined and understood is "a sign [...] which refers to its object not so 
much because of any similarity or analogy with it, nor because it is associated with 
general characters which that object happens to possess, as because it is in dynamical 
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(including spatial) connection with the individual object" (Peirce 107). Already, with this 
first definition, we see that the scope of what counts as an index is quite broad and this is 
especially true when it is contextualized within Peirce's doctrine of signs, which, truth be 
told, is highly complex and unwieldy. But be that as it may, sufficient gains have been 
made over the years leaving us with a maneouverable corpus of concepts that allow us to 
deepen our understanding of the trace via this novel semiotic category. 
Charles Sanders Peirce, mathematician and logician, developed a general theory 
of signs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that is difficult compared to 
Ferdinand de Saussure's. Whereas Saussure's semiology consists of a signifier (acoustic 
support) and the signified (concept) that together make up a sign whose meaning is the 
product of a culturally determined system of differences, Peirce's theory is evolutionary 
and is premised on a sign made of three constituent parts. This implies that the meaning 
of any given sign generates and derives from its relation to other signs but, unlike 
Saussure, (who would privilege relations of difference within a coherent system); the 
modes of relationality that wield (Peircian) semiosis are considerably more eventful. 
Consider the following definition of the sign according to Peirce: "A representamen, is 
something which stands to somebody for something in some respect of capacity. That 
sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for 
something, its object" (Peirce 99, emphasis in original). Perhaps the most fundamental 
principle that must be extracted from this definition prior to our expanding upon it is that 
both the representamen and the interpretant are signs. Although the object, the 
representamen and the interpretant always together make up a sign, they—with the 
exception of the object (which does not exclude the possibility of mediation)—are signs 
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in and of themselves. Furthermore, semiosis happens in a sequence and, for that reason, 
meaning is the outcome a temporal process; and, what is more, the category of the 
'object' endures throughout the process no matter how far along the sequential chain we 
happen to be. Floyd Merrel underlines the ultimate repercussions of Peirce's theory of 
signs when he writes: "To assert that a text takes leave of the world is to go against the 
entire grain of Peircian semiotics" (31). That said, while the semiotic chain initially starts 
out, Merrel explains, with "corporeal, visceral, physical sensations" (Merrel 300), i.e. 
sign-events involving what lies "out there," the further along one gets into the semiotic 
chain, the more one finds that the prominence of sign-events of a phenomenological 
nature dwindle and the more the conceptual takes over. These distinctions are 
particularly significant when we compare Peirce's model to Saussure's whose theory of 
signs led to the discovery of synchronicity as a legitimate and productive way of reading 
meaning and has, since its inception, severed the textuality of linguistic processes from 
the phenomenal world by arguing that referentiality was inconsequential to the processes 
of signification. Peirce's model, both in its conception and in its aftermath, is radically 
different from Saussurean semiology. 
Therefore, to reiterate, whereas the Saussurian sign is composed of a 
Signified/Signifier (=Sign), the Peircian sign consists of three sign components: a 
representamen (itself a sign) - object - interpretant (itself a sign), which will generate 
ever more and more interpretants and therefore, more and more signs each of which will 
share the triadic structure of the first one, and will all be interconnected.10 Disciplinary 
differences still surround the respective definitions of the representamen, the object and 
See Figure I in the Appendix for a visual representation of the semiosis process as conceived by Peirce. 
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the interpretant and how they relate to each other, but staying faithful to the road most 
traveled and substituting it pragmatically for a consensus that is not there, we will say: 
the represententamen is the formal support; the object is that to which the signs refers, 
what "it represents" (Goudge 52), or that which, in the real, the sign is related to; finally, 
the interpretant constitutes the conceptual component of the triad. As already mentioned, 
there is debate about how these categories should be defined, especially with regard to 
the object and the interpretant. Several commentators confuse the interpretant with the 
individual doing the interpreting; this is clearly not the case. The interpretant is closer to 
Saussure's notion of signified/concept, meaning that the interpretant is "in mind" but is 
not the mind.11 Others assume that because every sign relates to an object, that that 
object is always a part of life-world, or that it is always referential, and it is also clear that 
this is not the case since this would exclude all those signs whose objects are explicitly 
fictional. What is without dispute is that this triadic structure is always at play, according 
to Peirce, wherever there is signification. 
The triad of the sign is indivisible. And from this triad Peirce developed a 
complex classification of signs that attempted to discrimate the particularities of signs 
"first, according as the sign is in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a 
general law; secondly, according, as the relation of the sign to its object [...]; thirdly, 
according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of fact" 
(Peirce 101). In its simplest terms, Peirce developed a series of trichotomies that 
approached the sign from the perspective (a) of the representamen (b) the 
It is important to note that the definition of "interpretation" and "interpretant" take on a much broader 
definition in the hands of Thomas Sebeok who places various biological evolutionary processes under the 
rubric of "interpretant". Given that I am not entirely sympathetic or inclined to zoo-semiotics, I have 
chosen to abstain frpm broadening the definitional body of the terms more than they already are. 
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representamen/object relation (c) the sign/interpretant relation. These classifications tell 
us a great deal about the particular and variegated ways in which the representamen, 
object and interpretant relate to one another and their many possible combinations make 
for an exhaustive typology of signs (Peirce would identify as many as sixty-six). 
Although Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotics extends beyond his second division 
of signs in accordance with their relation to objects, it is, without question, the chapter of 
his work that has generated the most influence. Peirce's classification of the icon, index 
and symbol distinguishes the various relations signs have to their objects. Peirce's theory 
of signs underwent perpetual change and several revisions, and deciding on any 
authoritative definition for any of the three classes of signs, is subject to debate. 
Nevertheless, a glance at the disciplinary orthodoxy suggests that there is enough 
consensus to state that a) an icon is a sign "which refers to the Object that it denotes 
merely by virtue of characters of its own" (Peirce 102), meaning that a motivation based 
on similarity inheres between the sign and the object b) a symbol "refers to the Object 
that it denotes by virtue of a law" (Peirce 102), suggesting that the sign's relation to its 
object is established through convention and is therefore arbitrary c) the index is a sign 
that is existentially related to its object. In other words, the index is motivated by its 
object, not because it resembles it in some capacity, as is the case of the icon, but because 
it signals the existence of its object by virtue of having undergone "actual modification" 
(102) by it. It is important to note that although these definitions might leave us with the 
impression that there are some objects that are icons, indexes and symbols, and others 
that are not; these Peircian categories are not meant as ontological statements. As David 
Clarke succinctly puts it: "The index and the icon are modes of signification rather than 
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categories of objects, and indeed no one type of sign (whether icon, index or symbol, to 
use the terminology of Charles Sanders Peirce) is ever found in pristine isolation" (52). 
We know this because Peirce suggested that all three modes of relationality-cum-
signification were involved to different degrees in all acts of signification and, also, 
because he warned that there is no such thing as a "pure index". 
Peirce's method has unfortunately inspired an analytic literature structured around 
this assumption. Indeed, some of the most significant scholarly contributions dedicated 
to Peirce's index takes an approach that scrutinizes the list of definitional features which 
Peirce claimed the indexical sign fulfilled, unveiling inconsistencies in the model and 
doubting the range of its applicability. (Goren Sonnessan calls this the "orthodox 
approach".) While the approach has cast doubt on the systematicity of Peirce's thought 
on the subject, the result is one that leaves the specter of a "pure index" lingering, or that 
what the index and indexicality should be about is the fulfillment of all of Peirce's 
criteria. Arthur Burks and Thomas Goudge's seminal essays have both adopted this 
approach and in each, the six characteristics of the indexical sign are scrutinized in turn, 
and in almost every instance, exceptions to Peirce's rules make themselves known. It 
has, therefore, proven difficult to formulate a systematic and consistent account of the 
indexical sign from Peirce's writings. Albert Atkin, however, highlights the following 
passage from Peirce's writings to suggest that Peirce theorized with idealized types in 
mind: "By such a process, which is at bottom very much like mathematical reasoning, we 
can reach conclusions as to what would be true of signs in all cases, so long as the 
intelligence using them was scientific" (98). Peirce's writings, therefore, leave us in 
something of a double-bind: give up on the hope of ever finding a "pure index" but rely 
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on an "idealized type" (Atkin) to better understand the function and character of indexical 
signs. Therefore, the list of features for indexical signs always exceeds particular 
indexes; some indexical signs may fulfill some of the items but not others. Evidently, 
theorizing from an idealized type has exacerbated the tendency to objectify the category 
of the index, but keeping in mind the warning that indexical signs inconsistently fulfill 
Peirce's criteria, we list the definitional features proper to the indexical function and this, 
to begin to think seriously about what we know concretely about this sign function and 
how it might help properly situate the notion of trace in an ecology of meaning. 
Quoted here are the six features mined from Peirce's writings: 
An index has a direct physical connection with its object, or is really affected by that 
object, and the interpreting mind has nothing to do with the connection except to take 
note of it (1.372; 2.248; 2.299). (2) An index exerts a compulsive influence on its 
interpreter, forcing him to the indicated object. (3) An index involves the existence of its 
object, so that they form an inseparable pair. (4) The object is always an individual 
identity. (5) An index asserts nothing but only shows its object (3.361). (6) It also shows 
the relation between itself and its object to be a non-rational relation, a brute fact or 
Secondness. (Goudge 53-54) 
In general terms, this list of features leaves us with a sign whose representamen is in 
relation to its object regardless of the presence of an interpreter, and only becomes a sign 
when the latter takes it up as a sign. Therefore, that relation (between form and object) 
exists in the life-world but it's status as a sign results from the event of a (human or 
other) bystander coming across it and selecting it for interpretation. "Let us consider 
dreaming and merely sleeping. During heavy sleep a person is not usually awakened by 
customary sounds [...] But an unusual sound, say, a fire siren, even at a distance, may stir 
her" (Merrell 193). Some prospective sign-events are ignored and others are not, and, as 
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Merrel implies, selection is somewhere involved in choosing what will serve as a sign to 
someone for something. It is once we start thinking the sign-event itself that, I believe, 
the question of the indexical sign is complicated, especially if we look to Peirce's 
definitional features for inspiration and guidance. What does it mean that "an index 
exerts a compulsive influence on its intrepreter" or that "an index asserts nothing but only 
shows its object"? These two features, I suggest, are key to understanding where 
meaning may or might not fit in. First, because as Atkin points out, these two features 
involve the sign-interpretant relation, whereas the others mainly concern the sign-object 
relation (164). The following section deals exclusively with the statement "the index 
asserts nothing" because the second feature will be dealt with extensively when Lacanian 
psychanalytic concepts are introduced in the next section. 
The statement, "the index asserts nothing," is so deceptively straightforward that 
its conceptual ambiguity is often difficult to pin down. First, the statement implies what 
Peirce has iterated elsewhere, mainly that the indexical sign does not describe the object 
to which it relates. It might signify its object through contiguity, i.e. the interpreter 
would recognize that a fingerprint signifies that an individual imprinted it, but it would 
not conjure forth or describe that individual, as in "she has red hair. " It is in this way 
that it "directs attention to its object" (Peirce), it incites the interpreter to infer the 
presence or existence of an object but, beyond this, little else is given. Borrowing from 
Louis Prieto, we could take this to mean that the indexical sign bears a "significative 
indication" and not a "notification indication." The distinction is a subtle one. 
Significative indication might inform a forensic interpreter that a plot of land alternatively 
serves as a grave, but it would not, as Paul Bouissac makes clear, contain "attention! This 
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is intended to contain a message!" (Bouissac 306) Only linguistic signs would carry a 
notificative indication of this kind. And, consistent with Prieto's line of reasoning, Peirce 
himself suggests that the index has "nothing to do with meaning" (Atkin 165). But what 
exactly does this mean? And how can we truly bracket meaning if, as Ricoeur has 
suggested, that the trace is datable? As the phrasing of the last question suggests, the 
answer lies with the distinction between meaning, on the one hand, and information on 
the other and while the trace qua index may be informational it is certainly not 
meaningful.12 
Albert Atkin's essay entitled "Peirce on the Index and Indexical Reference" 
(2005) is perhaps the most significant contribution to Peircian scholarship in the way of 
orthodoxy as it self-consciously adopts the same method as Burks and Goudge (and 
publishes in the same journal). In it he insists that some indexes are informational and 
other are not. "He [Peirce] claims that a genuine index not only indicates its object, but 
provides information about it too. A degenerate index, on the other hand, simply 
indicates without conveying extra information" (Atkin 181). Before expanding further, 
an illustration is in order. Consider that I am pointing to a door. My pointing finger 
might be existentially related to the door but my pointing finger does not provide any 
information about the door. All it does is direct you towards the door, and if that 
movement is successful, you will infer correctly that my finger signifies that specific 
door. The reason why the indexical sign in this instance is not informational is because 
my finger and the door have nothing in common, or, as Atkin woud say, it involves no 
"iconic involvement" (181). An indexical sign is informational when the object and the 
12 
That "genuine information" is transmitted by means of the indexical sign is mentioned as early in in 
Thomas Goudge's essay "Pierce's Index": "For the index is by definition an informational sign which 
enables the interpreter to identify what it represents" (Goudge 54). 
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sign "share a quality" (Atkin 182), such as a fingerprint and a finger, a hair sample and 
the person who's hair it was. Here the "object largely determines the qualities of the 
sign" (Atkin 183). The specific and unique characteristics of the object make it such that 
the sign shares many of the same "qualitative commonalities". Think again of the 
fingerprint: we can infer from a fingerprint that it stands for an individual, or minimally, 
a finger. This semiotic leap is made possible by the fact that the representamen (the 
form) also resembles a finger (ex: the shape of the imprint resembles the shape of a finger 
tip). Traces, as a sub-category of indexes, are informational because, more than just 
indicating the existence of an object, its actual configuration may actually hint at what 
object is refers to. So, while it would still not describe its object, in the best of 
circumstances, something of the objects description might be inferred from it. This, let it 
be noted, does not bring us into the realm of meaning and textuality. Just because the 
representamen of a trace might resemble the object in some capacity, doesn't mean that 
we are dealing with meaning. The informational aspects of signs might add to the belief 
that meaning is on the side of the sign but it is not. Koff s following statement therefore 
makes no sense from a semiotic perspective: "I think of us as interpreters of the 
skeleton's language. Experience is the key to interpreting that language as accurately as 
possible" (13). The data of traces, which is why it lends itself so well to empiricism of a 
forensic nature, is not to be confused with meaning and the upcoming Lacanian reading 
will help us draw out this distinction even further. 
Before jumping ahead to Lacan, then, let up recap: Peirce's writings leave us with 
is a theory of semiotics that is perfused with sign-events, some of which are the product 
of a phenomenological interaction between the self and the world. And while Peirce 
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never (to my knowledge) made such an argument, I do not think it is a radical departure 
from his approach to suggest that if a developmental argument needed to be made that the 
initial emergence of meaning is one that would be built and generated from inferential 
accumulation. As Peircian scholar Merrel writes: "Language and logic erupt from icons 
and indices; the same can be said of the body, but it encompasses a subtle dynamic that 
language and logic only at best crudely reflect" (Merrell 328). Although inferential 
accumulation would not account for the entirety of the semiotic chain—for instance, it 
could not account for symbols that are of a purely conventional nature—it continues to 
have a place even after an individual masters language. This is an important caveat to 
our general discussion because, as we will see shortly, inductive accumulation is given 
little place in Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic semiology; and reading indexicality from 
the vantage point of psychoanalysis will call for some careful maneuvering. 
It is not obvious, in structuralism's and linguisticism's wake; to figure out how exactly 
inference and indexical events fit in against the symbolic structure of differences that 
most of us now assume are (pre)formative of meaning. Jacques Lacan did not believe 
that meaning was mastered through inferential accumulation13 and yet, the fact 
nevertheless remains that the enigmatic encounter/event with external objects, 
disturbances and traces beyond our immediate understanding happen throughout our 
lives, regardless of whether we have successfully appropriated language or not. If sign-
events involving indexicality are a fixture of our encounter with the world throughout our 
lives (and Lacan never contradicted this), how should these events be described? We 
"For language to be born, it must always already be grasped as a whole." (Lacan Psychoses 228) 
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already argued that indexical signs qua traces are, at best, informational and not 
meaningful, and therefore different than conventional signs. Yet persistently, meaning is 
projected onto them. 
French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan might seem an unusual figure to follow a 
discussion of Charles Sanders Peirce and the indexical sign, but his work is as much a 
psychoanalytic theory of semiotics as it is a body of psychoanalytic work that 
incorporates semiotics. Lacan was highly influenced by linguistics and the structuralists, 
but unlike them, adapted himself to these linguistic theories while continuing to struggle 
with the question of subjectivity.14 How is the subject formed? Where is the subject? 
This very simple question is behind his very complex theoretical corpus, which leaves us 
with a theory of subjectivity that is constituted through one's relation to images, the 
world of objects, and to the structures of language. The relation of (wo)man to language 
and to signs is an arduous one, and it is one that the subject cannot curtail; but it is 
through these complicated relational registers that the subject comes to form a sense of a 
self, a sense of the other, and even a sense of the world around him. In a way, speaking 
of semiotics and bracketing the subject, if we follow Lacan, is to risk a multitude of 
deceptive a prions and presuppositions that would negatively affect both our conception 
of signs and sign-events and how we are affected by them. Reconsider, for instance, the 
savage inscriptions written about by Alphonso Lingis. His anthropological findings 
suggest that meaning and inference did not explain the production of the inscriptions, and 
more, reading these inscriptions as signs leads to error. Rather their proliferation was 
explained by means of Sigmund Freud's theory of the libido. The scars are linked with a 
14 
Structuralism and the subject were thought to be mutually exclusive. See Terry Eagleton Introduction to 
Literary Theory (2003) 
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pleasure the savage has with himself (Lingis 24) and to an unbound excitation. If there is 
one thing that psychoanalysis can teach us as we consider the trace qua index it is that 
signs, corporealities, can be invested with libidinal energy and can also displace it; this 
dynamic has more to do with the projection of meaning, the assumption of 
anthropomorphism than meets the eye. 
Lacan rarely spoke of the index or the trace. Even when he raised the issue in his 
seminars it was usually to illustrate what he was not talking about or was not interested 
in. Lacan built his theory of semiotics from and in reaction to Saussure's model, and so 
the question of arbitrariness (between signifier and signified) was salient even that it 
become more radical once he personalized it.15 Nevertheless, even if the trace was used 
as an illustration of what the linguistic sign was not, his writings leave us with novel 
distinctions between the two as it does some alternative ways of thinking indexical sign-
events. In his third Seminar The Psychoses Lacan addresses the issue directly. Forgive 
the lengthy quotation: 
Let's begin with the biological sign. In the very structure, in the morphology, of animals 
there is something that has this captivating value due to which its receiver, who sees red 
of the robin redbreast for instance undertakes a series of actions or henceforth unitary 
behavior that links the bearer of the sign to its perceiver. Here you have what gives us a 
precise idea of what be called natural meaning. [...] Then there is the trace, the footprint 
in the sand, the sign about which it its negative aspect draws the natural sign to a limit at 
which it becomes evanescent. The distinction between sign and object is quite clear here, 
since the trace is precisely what the object leaves behind once it has gone somewhere 
else. [...] But the signifier is a sign that doesn't refer to any object, not even to one in the 
The arbitrariness of Lacan's model of semiology is more radical than Saussure's in that, according to 
Lacan, the Signifier and the Signified are never solidly anchored to one another. Rather, the Signified 
moves and wavers under the Signifier. Whereas Saussure assumed that the conceptual plane has natural 
divisions (like the joints of an arm, for example), Lacan rejected this outright. 
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form of a trace, even though the trace nevertheless heralds the signifier's essential 
feature. It, too, is the sign of an absence. (Lacan Psychoses 167^ 
This excerpt clearly displays a logical progression—which should not be mistaken as 
evolutionary—from the most natural (animalistic) signs to the most elevated in the 
culture of man, as it superimposes different semiotic registers. The trace, according to 
Lacan sits somewhere in between the two: it is like a signifier in that it signifies an 
absence (i.e., the object that is not longer here), whereas it is debatable whether or not 
natural meaning (a.k.a biological reactions) might be at play in indexical signification 
(though certainly indexicality is involved in behavioral reactions). With both the 
biological sign and the trace, signification is thought to be relatively stable, meaning that 
there is a one-to-one relation that exists between the sign and the object and/or reaction. 
The relation between the Signifier and the Signified, terms borrowed from Saussure but 
readapted to correspond to psychic reality, are bound by a tautological cultural imposition 
instituted during the Oedipal stages of a child's development. 
Lacan represents the relationship between the Signifier and the Signified as S/s (in 
identical order) because, as Lorenzo Chiesa explains: "The signifier logically precedes 
and causes the signified" (48). The level of the Signifier is "supreme" in as much as it 
stands as an autonomous, differential and material plane that divvies and assigns a 
linguistic value to everything which it names. But unlike the trace, or the Saussurean 
sign, where the object on the one hand, and the signified (concept) on the other, 
correspond neatly with the Signifer, Lacan posits that the interplay of Signifiers 
constitute and order the Signified and more radically still, does not cause the signified to 
forever cement itself to a Signifier. This implies that the plane of the signified, an 
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amorphous, jointless mass is always in an unstable relationship to the Signifiers that 
wield them and for that reason, Lacan writes, "the relationship between the signified and 
the signifier always appears fluid, always ready to come undone" (261). The only reason 
that the two planes happen to meet or converge is because of what Lacan calls the points 
de capiton, or the "quilting points." The image of the quilting points metaphorically 
convey the arbitrary but necessary way in which the Signifier and the Signified must be 
linked to one another in order for an individual to properly appropriate language and take 
one's place in the social domain. But these quilting points are not genetically 
predetermined or even determined within the system of language, nor does the referential 
object secure the two planes to one another—the bond is imposed by culture. This 
symbolic function (securing a bond between the two planes) is typically handed down 
generationally to the father who must impose this arbitrary law upon the child because he 
inherits the paternal function. Lacan calls this the Nom/Non-du-pere (Name/No-of-the-
Father) because "both confer identity on the subject (it names him, positions him within 
the symbolic order) and signifies the oedipal prohibition, the 'no' of the incest taboo" 
(Evans 119). For example, your name is Philip, you are the youngest born male of the 
Montpellier family and you may not have your mother all to yourself. Thus, Philip 
Montpellier is named, told he occupies and must assume a term in a symbolic 
oppositional (+/-) structure (he is a boy, not a girl) and he will have to find a love object 
other than his mother because she is not his to have. This foundational law introduces the 
child to a roadmap that he must follow as he pursues his sexual relations and, more 
generally, as he maneuvers the symbolic and appropriates language as his own. We 
could say that it is the laws of kinship (which Lacan borrowed from Claude Levi-Strauss) 
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enforced during the Oedipal stages that the child finally enters and takes his place in 
culture. In other words, he immerses human communication, with its contractual 
constraints and prohibitions, and takes leave of the modes of communication that 
predominate in the animal realm. The introduction of the paternal metaphor, as it is also 
called, not only inaugurates a system of exchange (if you give mommy back to me, you 
may eventually get a woman of your own) it also entails that meaning (the conceptual 
plane that rests on the side of the signified) is ensnared within these self-same structures 
of exchange and, not as many suppose, from the life world. Therefore, the signified is 
purely psychological and cultural in that the network of Signifiers affects it. The latter 
are determinative vectors in the economy of demand and desire. It is for the 
aforementioned reasons that Lacan specifies that "the system of language, at whatever 
point you take hold of it, never results in an index finger directly indicating a point of 
reality; it's the whole of reality that is covered by the entire network of language (32)".16 
The frequency with which Lacan interpellates the indexical function in antithesis 
to the symbolic function of language implies: a) that the symbolic function of language is 
unstable, culturally determined b) that the index is stable, straightforward and not cultural 
in its entirety. And yet the trace and the signifier share a fundamental structural dynamic: 
they signify an absence. Ergo, the trace, like the signifier, stands for something that is no 
longer present. Indeed, the most productive entry into a psychoanalytic reading on the 
indexical sign-event is to think of it in terms of the fort/da game which Freud observed in 
Elsewhere in The Psychoses. Lacan writes: "There is an absolute non-equivalence between discourse 
and pointing. Whatever you take the ultimate element of discourse to be reduced to, you will never be able 
to replace it it with your index finger" (137). 
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his nephew. We can imagine how the reading of the trace could serve as a "cultural 
achievement", i.e., once a trace or indexical sign is taken up and valued for its 
synecdochic relation to the missing whole, or once it is prized for it's capacity to make 
present something in abeyance, the trace is elected to the level of the signifier. Absence 
and presence can also be metaphorically represented as oppositions (+/- or fort/da). My 
intention in pointing this out is not to suggest that the trace should be given the status of 
language, but rather to underline how the trace, while it may not have a central role to 
play within a post-oedipal symbolization, stands nevertheless as a rudimentary form of 
symbolization that makes way and prepares one for the acquisition of language. 
Furthermore, the mastery felt by the child in his ability to compensate for the absence of 
another via the presence of a sign is not something that is relinquished with the 
introduction of language. If anything, the semiotics of the trace demonstrates again and 
again how the object in absentia (the object indexically signified) is the accomplished 
sacrifice of a presence that will lay the ground for its artificial return. 
If the representamen of the index retroactively substantiates the object it must 
necessarily have lost, the play of repetition on the part of the interpreter/child should be 
conceived as nothing less than the inaugural play of symbolization evidenced in Freud's 
analysis of the fort/da game in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). Like the toddler 
who experienced jubilation in the monitoring of the disappearance and reappearance of a 
spool of thread, traces, by virtue of their synecdochic relation to another and by the fact 
that they signify an absence like signifiers, always already ask that we reposition 
ourselves as subjects of this game of compensation and consolation—always registering 
17 
The fort/da game was a game observed by Freud in his young nephew. This young boy was observed 
manipulating the presence and absence of an object attached to a spool of thread. When the child would 
have the object disappear he would yell out "da!", and when he would make it reappear "fort!" 
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the absence of the trace, but also turning this absence into an positivity (historical or 
otherwise) that can be known and mastered. In other words, the game also transforms the 
lost presences as a knowable object and a field of discovery and exploration. Therefore, 
the seeming puerile drama of the fort/da game is not contained to a phase of early 
childhood development; we reenact this ritual to temper our "feelings of loss" (Isaacs 76) 
and console ourselves with the sudden absence of another via its symbolic recovery (i.e. 
traces). 
Lacanian scholar Lorenzo Chiesa repeatedly refers to indexes as 
"gestaltic/imaginary signs" because, he claims, they are bi-univocal (the signified does 
not move arbitrarily under the signifier).18 It is for this reason that arguments are often 
made that traces and other motivated signs are semiotically impoverished—they are 
comparatively straightforward. However, traces cease to be merely informational 
accoutrements the moment they are deemed meaningful, the moment that we decide that 
they concern us. Once a subject says to herself "this concerns me" or once she 
documents a trace and preserves it because "it has a greater meaning for me", she is 
touched by meaning. The indexical signification involved also involves a subject. 
("Dammit, we [Physicians for Human Rights] had a chance to identify these people and 
help make meaning out of all this death") (Koff 34). Once we imagine ourselves to be 
the intended receiver of information, we have already made meaning the issue. And even 
if it is not given forthright, we are already anticipating it or paving a way for it. As Lacan 
reminds us: "Only a subject can understand a meaning, conversely every meaning 
We could think of this in the sense that the existential relation that formally links the representamen and 
the object serves the same function as does the No-of-the-Father in establishing a relation between the 
signifier and signified. 
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phenomenon implies a subject" (Aggressiveness 11). The fort/da game might help us 
understand the fetishistic character of traces and why it is elected as a point of fixation for 
the subject. Still, it doesn't really get us very far towards understanding the problem of 
anthropomorphism or the meaning of which traces continuously suffer. Neither do we 
make much headway by admitting the comparative inferiority of the trace against the 
linguistic signifier. I propose that we look to Lacan's theory of the imaginary register 
and apply it in tandem with Lingis' work on the savage inscription.20 The expressive 
index—a semiotic category which has no place in the 'real' but nevertheless belongs to 
our psychic reality, so to speak, uncovers and reflects a libidinal function that extends 
beyond the conjure of absence and presence. It also sheds light on how imaginary 
meconnaissance and its anthropomorphic undercurrent does more than compensate for 
the presence of an absent other. It represents a "formal fixation" (Lacan "Aggressivity") 
that shields us against persecutory images of "corporal dislocation" (Lacan 
"Aggressivity" 12). In a sense, I am proposing that we conceive of the anthropomorphic 
reading of the trace as an imaginary hold against the vicissitudes and dismembering 
effects of our interest in topographical signs (Lingis). 
Representations of forensic investigations report two general themes: one theme 
assembles spilled guts, lesions, dismembered limbs, disfigured faces, still fleshy anterior 
19 
"The signified is not the things in their raw state, already there, given in an order open to meaning. 
Meaning is human discourse insofar as it always refers to another meaning" (Psychoses 119). 
20 
I need to thank Peter C. van Wyck, my thesis supervisor, for suggesting that I look to Lacan's theory of 
the imaginary in tandem with the index in the Fall of 2005 when I was first developing my object of study. 
See Peter C. van Wyck's theory of the indexical imaginary in his paper "Emphatic Landscapes: Notes on 
the Ethical Intinerary of Landscape" March (2007). {Courtesy of the author.) To be published in the 
Canadian Journal of Communication Spring (2008). For more on the index's status as imaginary see 
Lorenzo Chiesa. Subjectivity and Otherness: A Philosophical Reading of Lacan. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
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iliac spines, mold on a forehead, cavities in skulls, trauma to genitalia, mutilated and 
amputated bodies in decomposition intermixed with soil, blood splatter, stomach 
contents, fingernails; the second theme brings together vocalic bodies, speech acts and 
synecdochic fragments intentionally signifying, intentionally communicating and always 
meaningful. Both themes combine, simultaneously upholding and undermining each 
other; the voices of the dead are in the same place as mute remains. It should seem rather 
obvious now that voices do not belong but they do nonetheless, and in the same place 
where others correctly draw associations with the pornographic and the scopophilic 
phantasies available to the witness or bystander. What else, after all, are the endoscopic 
visions so popular in forensic dramas if not a surfacing of the body where depth once 
presided? 
No doubt mass graves and crime scenes are sensational as they lay the ground for 
a theatrics of trauma and cruelty that arrests and excites. "All that excites some dark 
dredges of lechery and cruelty in us, holding our eyes fixed with repugnance and lust" 
(Lingis 22). To borrow from Lingis, the excitations and pleasure we experience in 
reading and seeing these morseled bodies and the inscriptions of violence that cut across 
them is to libidinize the disturbances and the crime scenes that harbor them. The forensic 
scientist leads the camera and our eye to each perforation, cavity and orifice—opens the 
mouth and runs his latex-gloved fingers under and above the tongue, around and behind 
the lips, along the teeth. We read as she runs her hands along the bones, gathers bits of 
hair. The forensic inscription (meaning the scientific documentation of the trace) is a 
social practice that extends the libidinal zone ever wider and wider. There's a stain on 
the sheet, a hole in a sweater, a suspicious thread between the deceased's teeth. Like the 
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savage inscriptions (Lingis), graves are sites of libidinal investiture, where scientists are 
scouting the ground first. There are no signs yet, no identities, nothing has been counted 
and no voices. As of yet, it is just earth and bits. The surface, so to speak, is being laid 
out. But this process is cast against another theme, an absence experienced as a positivity 
(Isaacs 88). The disarray and the dislocation will be set to order, and if it is felt to require 
order it is because that order is also an absence felt as presence. Skeletal remains will be 
reassembled, identities will (hopefully) be recovered, bodies will be counted and the 
sensuality of the trace will give way to expression. 
In "Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis," Jacques Lacan explains that similar scenes 
of dismemberment, perforation and mutilation constitute "spontaneous themes of our 
imagination" (13), which are themselves revelatory of a primordial relationship we have 
with our own bodies and the world around us. These morbid fixations represent 
unconscious fantasies that are structurally concomitant with the fantasies of unity, 
consciousness and corporeal integrity of the subject. These tormenting scenes, or images, 
(be they actually represented or simply inferred through our violent acts) satisfy an 
aggressive impulse in man that is spurned by the nature of (wo)man's relationship to his 
or her own ego. Which is to say, that although these scenes disturb us they also satisfy 
something in us and serve a function in our imaginary relationship to the world. Indeed, 
these "phantasmagorias" of corporeal dislocation are so fundamental that Lacan insists 
that they are reflected in practices such as "tattooing, incision, and circumcision rituals in 
primitive societies [...] in that it [they] contradicts, in advanced societies, respect for the 
natural forms of the human body, the idea of which is a latecomer to culture" (Lacan 13). 
Essentially, what Lacan is suggesting by positioning 'savage' inscriptions against 
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'civilized' conceptions of the body is that the idea of an integral body, of a coherent self, 
of the body as a property of one's own, is a necessary idea that has the unfortunate habit 
of making us suffer. This suffering, which we inadvertently inflict on ourselves, is 
represented in these voluntary practices and rituals of mutilation, dislocation and de-
centering. In a sense, the satisfaction we get from these phantasmagorias of 
fragmentation and cruelty represents back to us an aggressivity spurned by our 
conception of self. But let us look closer to Lacan's seminal theory of the mirror stage 
and the imaginary to substantiate and make sense of this thesis. 
Jacques Lacan's theory of the subject of the imaginary emerges out of his early 
work on the mirror stage (years 1936 to 1949 approx.), a phase in child development 
during which the ego and the conscious self are allegedly constituted for the first time. 
Although the mirror stage is meant as an empirically verifiable stage in a subject's 
becoming, it is also a developmental metaphor for the various ways in which the subject 
qua ego is (re)constituted throughout one's life by means of his or her relationship to the 
procession of imagos to which she will invariably be confronted on an ongoing basis. 
Essentially, the mirror stage, even if we re-present it here as a singular event, is never 
fully overcome by the subject. Even if external factors will later quell the subject's 
subjugation to its dynamics (Lacan calls this the Symbolic order), he is perpetually 
structured by it. Therefore, the mirror stage is not something that the child overcomes 
and leaves behind; rather the hold of the imaginary persists as a structuring and 
(de)formative event for the individual until death. The following description of the 
mirror stage is a combined reading of Lacan's Ecrits "The Mirror Stage as Formative of 
the I Function" and "Aggressivity and Psychoanalysis". 
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The mirror stage is deceptively simple considering the extensive contributions 
Lacan's reading offered in terms of understanding intra- and inter-psychic development: 
a child between the ages of six and eighteen months (Lacan "Mirror" 4) recognizes 
himself in a mirror (or, where there is no mirror, recognizes himself in what others 
around him reflect back to him about him). This might appear an innocent and even 
banal event in a person's development, but this ocular drama between the child and her 
own image is foundational of a self-conscious subjectivity. It occasions the birth of the 
"I" for the child, a self-consciousness, in short: an ego. Forgive the spoiler, but it bears 
underlining that the tremendous gains a child will get from this event are marred from 
their inception—meaning that there is a structural dehiscence at the very heart of the 
subject of the mirror stage that will always undermine him. The child will come out of 
the mirror stage with a sense of possessing a coherent ego, of being an integrity in a 
world of integrities, but unbeknownst to him, his situation is always already perilous. 
The child staring into the looking glass is nothing less than larval in maturity, 
"still trapped in his motor impotence and nursling dependence" (Lacan "Mirror" 4). He 
is plainly inadequate. But what he finds in his double-cum-image is something that 
represents to him the promise of something greater. The child finds himself seduced, 
fixated and "lured" by the image of himself and akin to animal instincts (Chiesa 17), he 
experiences the image as a gestalt (a whole that is more than the sum of its parts). 
Enamored as he is by this ideal image, he identifies with it. The gestaltic image gives the 
child a sense of unity which he does not yet have, and it is for this reason that Lacan 
insists that the reflection serves an "orthopedic" function (Lacan "Mirror" 6). It allows 
the child to think of himself as more than he is in actuality. Out of this event, the toddler 
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forms and assumes an ideal-I, or an ideal-ego. The gap between the idealism of the image 
and the child remains, however, because whatever assimilating and pacifying effects 
identification may have brought to the subject, Lacan insists that this identification is 
founded on false premises. 
But the important point is that this form (Ideal-I) situates the agency known as the ego 
[...] in a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for any singular individual 
or rather, that will only asymptotically approach the subject's becoming, no matter how 
successful the dialectical syntheses by which he must resolve, as I, his discordance with 
his own reality. ("Mirror "4) 
The fictional direction of which Lacan speaks in this quote is elsewhere described as 
"misrecognition," a psychic process whereby the individual identifies so thoroughly with 
the idealized image of self that he consubstantiates himself with it. This 
consubstantiation, however, is a fiction. The child recognizes himself in the mirror but 
doesn't quite recognize his or her relationship to it. This is why, as Lorenzo Chiesa 
points out, identification ironically coincides with alienation and why the ego, for Lacan, 
is spoken of as an other. This irreconcilable and therefore unending dialectic (between 
identification and alienation) will form the first structure of human subjectivity. 
But the subject suffers—despite the jubilation and excitement that the mirror 
stage affords her. Even when she grows out of her infantile stage, in the eyes the child 
the idealism of the imago will always cause her to experience a discord between it and 
herself. Because alienation is never neutralized through identification, because the two 
coincide and mutually constitute each other, the subject will always strive for an idealism 
beyond her reach. The subject suffers this idealism, this gestalt, even if it is necessary for 
her to survive. This is where the problem of aggressivity presents itself within the theory 
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of the mirror stage: the subject is constituted by the image but is also reminded of his 
inadequacy because of the gestaltic halo that is always in excess and pressing on the 
subject's (un) conscious. The subject's relationship to his body, refracted as it is through 
the other specular 'body' in the mirror, is simultaneously secured and undermined by the 
tragic vacillations of alienation and identification. However—and this is worth noting— 
the subject does not experience his alienation in its permanence, it is always something 
which the subject unconsciously believes he can overcome even if is an impossibility. 
Essentially, his constitutive alienation in the externalized other of the imaginary 
constitutes a form of knowledge that does not want to be known or assumed by the 
subject. Nothing short of the individual's survival would be at stake should alienation be 
assumed over identification with the image. 
The dialectical movement of alienation and identification, it bears repeating, 
begins the moment the child identifies with and introjects the image; because their effect 
is an Ideal-ego, or a consciousness of self, for the child it is only through the mirror stage 
that both the bodily gestalt and corporeal dislocation are given to experience. The issue 
is not just that the Ideal-ego is troubled by dis-individuation but that is it only in so far as 
there is an Ideal-ego that fantasies of dislocation are felt as troubling. Lorenzo Chiesa 
rightly corrects those who read the orthopedic function of the specular image as a 
corrective to an experience of dislocation that is thought to precede it. "The two imagos 
can only emerge together. The baby recognizes the fragmentation of his real body only 
when he starts to be attracted by the completeness of his specular image" (Chiesa 18). 
Because identification is the seductive process of the two, it also leaves us with an 
illusion that we have pacified something. The fact is we only suffer phantasmagorias of 
77 
dismemberment once we have assumed the identity/ontological coherence for the world 
and ourselves. The imagos of the fragmented body emerge in tandem with the imagos of 
bodily unity. 
Reading this, it should no longer strike us as a contradiction that the dual themes 
of corporeal fragmentation and 'spectral' voices coincide in representations of forensic 
scientific investigations. Just as the infant's fantasies of dislocation cast out "into the 
world the disorder that constitutes his being" (Lacan "Aggressivity" 21), our libidinal 
attraction to the pele-mele terrain of foresic investigation is a topography of "aggressive 
images" (Lacan "Aggressivity" 14). Though it is presented as a necessary detour to the 
revivification of intentional expressions, the topographical movements across 
dismembered corpses are obstinately horizontal—it re-incises against the grain of the 
"natural form of the body" (Lacan 13) before piecing it back together and made to speak. 
Our subjectivities are ephemerally morseled, so to speak, and then solidified. If these are 
signifiers, they do not mean anything. They are eroticized. Alphonso Lingis describes 
these libidinal nodes of investiture "subjectivity effects" and fleeting egoisms invisible to 
the epistemological biases of the Western subject—where everything is assumed to occur 
within the realm of intentionality. Where everything is subjected to the other side of the 
imaginary. 
On the other, colonizing, side of our imaginary episteme, the world of objects, 
things and animals are vehicles for our imaginary delusions of unity, coherence and 
ontological self-sustainability. "The individuation and inorganic beings alike is possible 
only on the basis of an underlying imaginary anthropomorphization" (Chiesa 22). In the 
imaginary register, all that is other is a recognizable other—an other that is like us. An 
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other that keeps us to ourselves. The forensic scientist steps into a grave and sees herself 
reflected back at her. She finds a handful of marbles in the pocket of the deceased. She 
is at the scene of a crime. She (and we) find comfort in the belief that there is meaning in 
this, that this gravesite with the marbles, is a semiological problem. Seeing ourselves 
where there is no message is a defense, it is orthopedic in its anticipation. The forensic 
scientist tells us that the dead have a story to tell and he points at a speck that means 
nothing to me or to you. We wait for a message. 
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Chapter Three: The Way of the Anecdote 
The trace demands a story. She who stumbles across a scar is aware of its literary 
character when she recognizes that the disturbance compels language, stimulates and 
transforms it. A scar does not possess the intrinsic qualities we ascribe to literature but it 
draws language to itself, cajoles and moves it in some directions and not in others and for 
that reason, infringes on the terrain of literary theory. Isabelle Stengers notes in passing 
in The Invention of Modern Science (2000) that indices have the capacity to "nourish the 
power of fiction as well as constrain it" (142.1). And if we were to translate this blithe 
remark into Deleuzian vernacular, we would have to say that indices have the ability to 
take open flight towards the literary and latch on to other systems of signification. It is 
true that territorial signs, such as indices, "would be nothing without the movements that 
deposit them" (Deleuze and Guattari 55) but it is also true that they inspire other 
movements that widen exponentially the sphere of expression. Helene Cixous' Stigmata: 
Escaping Texts (1998) is exemplary in this regard. There she treats scars as a means of 
autobiographical positioning—precious remnants and souvenirs of prior traumatisms and 
ultimately, she writes, "the promise of a text" (Cixous xiv). Cixous esteems her scars, 
first, because they conjure an analogy with personal signatures, signifiers, and, second, 
because they incite her to write. "I do not want the stigmata to disappear. I am attached 
to my engravings, to the stings in my flesh and my mental parchment. I do not fear that 
trauma and stigma will form an alliance: the literature in me wants to maintain and re-
animate traces" (Cixous xiv). The promise and potential for open textuality residing 
within or around the lesion means that it is also a privileged site of play, a site where 
language is simultaneously and precariously attracted to and repelled away from the 
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vorticular pull of physical trauma. Physical deposits/disturbances are intimately tied to 
the pleasures of telling and hearing stories and the literature they inspire take forms 
ranging from mainstream detective fiction to philosophy. In other words, indexes are not 
closed semiotic systems—they leak, they double, they are repeated and animated by 
language. The need to recapture organic signs inaugurates the linguistic. 
Ernst Bloch's recently translated Traces (2007; 1969), for example, transforms the 
inconspicuous habit of writing from traces into a self-conscious art of philosophizing. In 
his chapter "The Mark!" he explains his method outright, and like Cixous, themes of 
repetition and storytelling invariably come to the fore. "How such things came to notice 
will be retold here, and tentatively marked; lovingly, marking in the retelling; by marking 
intending and retelling [...] It's reading of traces every which way, in sections that only 
divide the frame" (Bloch 6). His approach is noteworthy for several reasons but concern 
us in two important respects: first, reading marks and storytelling are, in Bloch's mind, 
inseparable. The mark is deeply tied to narration, such that one repeats the other ad 
infinitum. Storytelling is inscriptive, it displaces the trace elsewhere than where it is and 
so extends and doubles it. Secondly, the formal structure of his work is such that it 
assigns an anecdote to each trace, imparting the reader not with a grand narrative but 
rather a catalogue of anecdoted markings each of which is pointed in different directions. 
Bloch recalls each of the traces that invited his fancy and follows each on a chain of self-
contained philosophical and literary tangents. Though simple, the formal dimensions of 
Traces rings true because it is what writing from traces effectively resembles: brief 
anecdotes, descriptions, and morals that might have easily been overlooked though, when 
pointed out, strike us as the more accessible of profundities. Structurally, at least, Ernst 
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Bloch's Traces is the diluted, elevated and un-adorned version of what we find elsewhere 
in detective fiction, in Cixous' stigma-texts or in forensic narratives. The only significant 
difference lies with the fact that they are catalogued, their relationship to traces assumed 
rather than demonstrated. The difference is trivial, however, because what interests us 
are the literary effects of traces. Bloch's is still, regardless of the fragmented nature of 
his work, a literature of traces because it is through a distinctly divinatory modality of 
philosophizing and writing that the work is strung together. 
Bloch's Traces and Cixous' Stigmata constitute academic examples that simulate 
and expand on the power of indices "to nourish the power of fiction" (Stengers 142.1) 
even as they self-consciously perform and remain faithful to modes of reasoning that are 
at heart divinatory, meaning they proceed from particular circumstances, particular 
traces, and write the event of their production and their significance. Indexical reasoning 
and literary discharges are unquestionably enmeshed, so much so that pointing it out 
might even seem to some a "banal" observation (Culler 172). "The hunter could have 
been the first 'to tell a story' because only hunters knew how to read a coherent sequence 
of events from silent signs left behind by their prey" (Ginzberg 89). The will to narrative 
spawned by traces is the bread and butter of Holmesian fiction and medical detection 
dramas, and the true-crime renditions of forensic detection are certainly no exception in 
that they too constitute a variation of the genre. In actuality, forensic practitioners, 
especially those who double as human rights advocates, never tire or reminding 
audiences of the deep-ties between the forensic excavation of remains and storytelling. A 
femur bone and a story are a grammatical unit according to our popular imaginary—we 
know through repeated suggestion that these items fit together. Forensic markings are the 
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eventful abrasions, the material fixtures and fragments that are the commonplace 
furnishings of crimes scenes and clandestine graves but their eventfulness is no less 
related to the production and proliferation of stories and the pleasure had on hearing and 
spinning a yarn from wayward fragments. And whether or not we are convinced with 
evolutionary hypotheses that indexical reasoning was at the origin of storytelling 
(Ginzberg, Sebeok "Communication," Deleuze and Guattari), the fact nevertheless 
remains that the potential for emploted narratives of past events (such as the event of a 
horse escaping an abbey and making his way down a path to a dung heap, an event that 
captured the imagination of Eco's readership in The Name of the Rose) is posited and 
reaffirmed with every suspected grave. 
It is when we consider the function of the trace that we find that the testamental 
value of the indexical sign lies with its unique relationship to narrative. The meaning of 
traces, unlike icons or symbols, is in many respects dependent on description, 
demonstration and the anecdotal. Peter Brooks, commenting on Freud's hermeneutics of 
dream interpretation, says the following of the meaning-making process as it is 
represented within the detective genre: "the detective story exhibits a reality structured as 
a set of ambiguous signs which gain their meaning from a past history which emplots the 
production of these signs as a chain of events, eventually with a clear origin" (Brooks 74, 
emphasis mine). If the meaning of the signs resides with the history of the movement 
that deposited them (alternatively, we can say that the meaning of the territory is in the 
histories of territorialization), and if these histories need to be established (in other words, 
written, since meaning cannot reside in the event itself) for meaning to be apprehended, 
then it seems only a reasonable assumption that the formal properties of the physical trace 
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are tied to historical and narrative explication. The trace demands a story, which is to say 
that the trace, in order for it to be semiotically embodied, must rely, if not on the 
assimilating thrust of the proto-semiosis and on the uncanny manifestations it stimulates, 
then on the productive conveniences of anecdotal modes of demonstration and 
explication. See this scar on my forehead? I was a child of four on a speedboat with my 
father when I fell off the deck of the boat and the propeller of the motor nicked my head. 
Where resides the motivation to narrative? the pull, the tug, which we invariably feel 
before traces? This chapter attempts to answer some of these questions, first drawing out 
the mutual dynamic of literary and divinatory modes of reasoning around indexicals, and 
eventually seating this dynamic within the broader context of historiography at large. 
The dual promise of anecdotes (read textuality) and re-inscription (read repetition) are 
such central components of the psycho-semiotic dimensions of the trace as they are to 
historiography that they merit closer revision. In this chapter, I draw on Paul Ricoeur, 
Roman Jakobson, Joel Fineman and Susan Stewart to suggest that the formal dimensions 
of the trace, namely its abductive character, serves as a motivation to a specifically 
anecdotal mode of narrative explication that is the product both of the formal constraints 
posed by traces and a desire for the recovery and exchange of personal, situated stories of 
trauma within human rights discourse. While this is not meant as a mapping of the 
economy of narrative exchange in the human rights arena, this chapter suggests itself as 
an attempt to recover the testamental uses of traces as well as the conveniences of 
medico-legal historiography to the human rights arena. In a sense, it seeks to get to the 
heart of what it means to find a story in every grave and why such a banal truth is 
perpetually intriguing to contemporary audiences. 
84 
For better or for worse, narrativistic readings of historiography have attuned us to 
thinking of historical understanding as the effect of narration and not, as was commonly 
believed, the strict application of logic to historical evidence. What are truth or historical 
realism if nothing other than narrative coherency? Though few ever denied the existence 
of the extra-symbolic, narrative accounts of historical events became a contentious issue 
because we were made re-aware that historical meaning is captive to semiological and 
rhetorical mediations. It seemed the last nail was hammered to the coffin when fictional 
and historical narratives were shown by Hayden White to depend on identical formal and 
figurative techniques (White Fictions 22) and, indeed, the widespread application of 
semiological and narratological interpretative methods had a heavy hand in shifting our 
attention away from the semiotics of logic and towards narrative structure and/or issues 
of representation animating historical discourse. The general effect was the shattering of 
generic boundaries; beyond their claims to truth and accuracy, historical narratives 
followed the same structure, the same grammar, as their fictional counterparts. The 
narratological approach, elsewhere criticized for subordinating the richness of individual 
narratives to geometric application (Gibson 5), and by some for sending the referent into 
permanent exile (Ricoeur; Runia), radically altered our readings of historical texts: 
representation became the political and disciplinary battleground and whatever 
persuasiveness historical evidence was assumed to possess turned out a mere effect of 
representational processes. Factuality and evidentiality were posited by and through 
language and were considered the effect of rhetorical maneuvers; they were constituted 
through language more than they were thought to constitute it. 
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Looking to the linguistic behavior of historians and novelists and finding them to 
be the same, representationalism and narratology pulled the rug from under positivists 
and empiricists who denied the primacy of signification to historical reasoning. 
However, in the same breath, its accent on narrative representation and written texts 
distracted from the archival encounters and the semiological/semiotic dramas regularly 
held there. The deconstruction of narrative fidelity also meant that we explained away, or 
had no use for, the desire for referentiality expressed in the "referential impulse" (Butler) 
of historicism. If we're not careful, the narratological perspective risks impressing upon 
us the sense that the writer's task is only to plug a 'geometrical' or coherent 'structure' 
with data, but matters are never so simple even if we accept that narrative codes are the 
same across disciplines and accept that they are formative of historical meaning. This 
explains why the self-declared return to materiality and move away from historiography 
announced by those who are planning a rebellion against "narrativism" and 
"representationalism" does not in actual fact stray very far from issues of narrative 
concerns. One only has to recall that the archival encounter as forensic pathologists and 
anthropologists represent it is an alleged encounter with narratives, a site where stories 
are born and spun. The recuperative, and therefore nostalgic, thrust of the archival stages 
to the historiographical debate inadvertently redirects us to the material imperative to 
writing and to textuality; so, while the appeal of going back to the archive might be, for 
scholars, the prospect of distracting themselves of theories they have tired of hearing, the 
enduring appeal for human rights advocates and forensic scientists is not the muteness of 
the archive but its spectral and testimonial attributes. In a sense, the movement amounts 
to a topographical migration from the finished text to the site of ongoing literary 
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production. For us to "return to the archive" and bracket narrative for the sake of 
changing topics of discussion would be irresponsible—not only methodologically (our 
general purpose here is to read a tropology)—but also because it would be ignoring what 
stares us blankly in the face: the ritual of storytelling is perpetuated by the indexical 
properties of human remains. The repetition of narrative is promised in the archival drive 
(Derrida Archive'). 
There are psychoanalytic explanations available to us that would explain the 
craving for narration caused by and expressed for material remains or traces (some of 
which will be brought up in this chapter) but before entangling ourselves in issues of 
affect and desire, it would be wise to pause and consider the formal semiotic properties of 
organic traces that distinguish them from other modalities of signification and how they 
might offer formal stimulus to narrative. In other words, our task is first to consider the 
motivations that stand on the side of the sign before taking into account psychogenetic 
influences that might complicate and add flesh to the interpretative process. Before 
moving to extrinsic relations, the following detour draws on Paul Ricoeur's reading of the 
trace, on a selection of basic distinctions established by narratologists, and on Roman 
Jakobson's canonical Fundamentals of Language (1956) to isolate the formal and 
intrinsic properties of the indexical sign that motivate or function as a motivation to 
narrative in the semiotician. Therefore, having previously surveyed what distinguishes 
indexical signs from its counterparts, and having already established that traces are 
explicitly indexical, we can now address the indexical properties and laws that lend 
themselves to anecdotal and narrative explication. It begins with time. 
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Paul Ricoeur's second volume of his trilogy Time and Narrative offers the most 
thorough and extensive reading of the trace's relationship to time. Ricoeur's thesis is that 
the trace signifies first and foremost a passing of time, which, he argues, is conveyed in 
the trace's capacity to paradoxically communicate the event of something past by the fact 
of it enduring in the present. Reflecting on the semantic reverberations between past and 
passing, he writes: "Note the apt homonymy between 'passed' (etre passe) (in the sense 
of having passed a certain place) and 'past' (etre passe) (in the sense of having 
happened). This is not surprising" (Time 119). In other words, if traces and remains bear 
an existential connection to their object it follows that the event of the object leaving a 
trace should have happened in the past. How else, after all, would it exist in the first 
place? This basic rule of regularity and apparently banal truth is what makes it possible 
for us to apprehend the semiotic modality of traces prior even to determining their precise 
'meaning'—the event, the object-cause, respective to each one. I can, for example, 
presume that a disturbance to a wall was caused by friction of something or someone 
against that wall without knowing what exactly caused it. Because I can apprehend a 
passing without identifying what did the passing means that temporality can be signified 
without my possessing the knowledge or the instruments to infer a precise sequence of 
events from the trace. Ricoeur's observation that 'pastness' is the preliminary meaning 
of the trace is really another way of saying that traces are abductive indices. Abductive 
indices are signs that have drifted from the contexts in which they were produced and 
endure in the present (Sonnessan "Indexicality" 2-3), but they also constitute the sub-
category of indexes that builds on our assumption that a contiguous relation exists 
between the trace and the object. Unlike an arrow or a pointing finger, abductive indices 
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don't perform or establish contiguity but simply draws on the semiotician's assumption 
that contiguity is a part of the semiotic ground. Abductive indices, as Goren Sonnesan 
writes, supposes that a regularity exists between facts (Bouissac 307) or presuppose a law 
in the world, and it is this law of regularity which must be inferred and followed. This 
pre-semiotic moment is significant first because, as discussed in the last chapter, the 
indexical mode of relationality is that upon which such impalpable and loose attributes as 
"connection" and "presence" hinge, and it is also that which signifies the distance that 
separates the event of creation from the event of interpretation. 
Ricoeur concludes that two conceptions of time "in mutual contamination" 
overlap and are accessible to observers by means of the trace: lived time or "calendar 
time" and universal or "astral time" (Time 104-120). The former refers to a linear and 
measurable conception of time. This perspective is highly empirical; being itself based 
on the "empiricist prejudice" that time is, in reality, linear (White 22). This empiricist 
prejudice also represents what most of us conventionally think about when we invoke 
"time." Calendars and clocks are fitting emblems since they metaphorically represent 
and measure the various segments with which we calculate the progression of time. 
Astral time, on the other hand, is the perspective of time to which vestiges apparently 
belong. The latter perspective is best described as existential. Ricoeur's thesis suggests 
that the spatial embodiment of pastness is in perpetual dynamic with but is distinct from 
the physical trace's traceability (i.e. the informational character of physical traces and the 
ever-increasing capacity of various actors—forensic scientists, medical practitioners, 
historians—to calculate the time that passed between the event of the trace and the event 
of analysis). All of this means that the trace functions as more than a mnemonic device 
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(vestige) but simultaneously serves as a record of linear temporal progression, both of 
which resonate and draw on a different conceptions of time even if they constantly 
bounce off one another. 
How could the trace left in space refer back to the passage of a sought-for-object without our 
calculations concerning time that passed between them that is between the time of the passage and 
the trace it left? Immediately, datability with its "now," "then," "earlier," and so on, is brought 
into play. However, no hunters or detectives would limit themselves to these vague references. 
Datability without a specific date is of no interest to them. (Ricoeur Time 124) 
The impulse to draw out the ontological relation between an event in the past and the 
brute fact of the trace's presence presupposes that the semiotician registers the formal 
aspects of the indexical sign. The formal property of the trace qua sign (its existential 
motivatedness) must be inferred before the will to actualize it/trace it makes itself felt. In 
other words, temporal dissonance must first be glimpsed from the trace through the 
realization on the part of the semiotician that one particular (the representamen) is 
ontologically related to another particular (object). The temporal dissonance signified via 
abductive indexicality, itself a preliminary semiotic feat, is invariably motivated by the 
formal constraints of the trace as a 'natural' sign. Temporal dissonance is not up to 
convention; rather, it is only the first in a series of interpretants emergent from an initial 
acknowledgement that the presence of the trace is dependent on a relation to another that 
exists independently of the interpreting mind. 
In directing attention towards the object, the index does not generate or characterize the object of 
our understanding as it would if we were attending the characteristics of the object itself. Instead, 
the interpretant of an index is just our understanding that the sign is standing for some object, 
nothing more. The later interpretants will complete this. (Atkin 164) 
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When the index is abductive as is the case with traces, completing the picture necessarily 
involves a tracing that is historical through and through. Thomas Sebeok, quoting 
Roman Jakobson, describes this property as "renvoi, or referral [...] The index, as it were, 
inverts causality [...] the vector of the index points to a bygone day in that a signans, the 
imprint of some foot in the sand, temporally rebounds to a signatum, the highly probable 
presence of some other" person ("Indexicality" 16, emphasis mine). The preliminary 
semiotic awareness of the trace's status as sign and the motivated impulse to establish a 
correlation between it and an event in the past, in turn, motivates specific figures of 
speech and it is there, I want to suggest, that we can locate the stimulus to narrative. 
Flights of territorialization are calculable and "the trajectory of the passage like the 
tracing of the trace, is relentlessly linear" (Ricoeur 124). There is nothing banal or trivial 
about the property of traces that coincides and supports our belief in the orderly 
succession of time. The very measurability of traces reflects a structural motivation to 
the use of figures of speech (a.k.a. rhetoric) to transmit the conclusions drawn by the 
semiotician from material data. How are we to theorize this bond between form/intrinsic 
structure and explication? Simply: that even though the meaning of the trace cannot be 
attributed to the general structure of language (difference in signification), the intrinsic 
structural characteristic that is abductive indexicality (the representamen/object relation 
that crosses temporal boundaries) is a motivated relation that must be followed through 
across time if it is to be followed at all. 
The trace is not a figure of speech for the obvious reason that there is nothing 
remotely linguistic about it, but the lapse of time glimpsed or abduced from the material 
trace must be "actualized in rhetoric" (Sebeok "Indexicality" 12). How does one 
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establish the anteriority inferred from traces if not by adopting tropic strategies? by 
emplotment? If we approach the issue from the perspective of the sign, and not from the 
finished text, we find that it is the meaning of the trace, the actualization of the trace's 
significance in language, which needs rhetoric. And is this not at heart why we can claim 
with confidence that traces lead to writing (Ong)? that there's a story to be had in every 
grave (Koff, Stover, Snow, Kirshner)? In effect, the will to narrative effected by the 
semiotics of the trace stems from the fact that it is difficult to describe the significance of 
the trace without having recourse to narrative modes of explication and this, precisely 
because temporality is a central component of indexicality. 
Anteriority is fundamental: "Temporal succession, relations of cause/effect or of 
an effect to its cause, or else some space/time vinculum between an index and its 
dynamic object [...] lurk at the heart of indexicality" (Sebeok "Indexicality" 13); and, we 
are up for an incredible challenge if we think we can describe causation without having 
recourse to rhetorical operations. As Jonathan Culler drawing on Nietzsche explains in 
The Pursuit of Signs (1981), any temporal sequence requires a "tropological operation" 
typically deployed in narrative structures (183). Consider, for instance, that I should 
notice a bruise on my thigh one evening and, thinking back to the events in my day, 
conclude that the bruise was probably caused by bumping against a table after breakfast. 
The fact of the matter is that one can't explain or draw out contiguity without borrowing, 
at least minimally, on the building blocks of narrative structure. 
Roman Jakobson's Two Fundamental Aspects of Language (1956) is the clearest 
on this point. While it is generally agreed that contiguity overlaps with and/or simulates 
causality in language, Jakobson's seminal analysis of contiguity and metaphor obviates 
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the question of causality altogether. True to his structuralist influences, Jakobson doesn't 
need to look to externalities such as causality to locate a will to narrative at the heart of 
contiguous relationality. Keeping in mind that registering cross-temporal contiguity 
characterizes indexical abductive reasoning, I want to revisit Jakobson's position on the 
similarity disorder identified in some language aphasiacs. My intention is not to reiterate 
the oft-cited and well-known analogy between indexicality and contiguity (so much is 
obvious) but to situate for the reader the contribution Jakobson's analysis brings to a 
literary theory of the index. Jakobson's work, I want to suggest, clearly situates 
narrativity at the heart of contiguity. 
Jakobson's Fundamentals of Language is a deceptively rich analysis of language 
and speech. The argument is familiar even half a century later. The entire work hinges 
on the twin tropes; metaphor and metonymy, both of which are said to reflect the 
structures of language and speech selection. Looking to emissive and receptive aphasics, 
Jakobson concludes that speech is achieved through selection and substitution based on 
similarity and contiguity. These "two modes of arrangement" (Jakobson 75) are always 
operating in speech. The interlocutor must pick and choose linguistic units among a 
series of equivalents (i.e. child, infant, kid) and then organize these linguistic units in a 
specific order (i.e. My child is sick with the fever). Jakobson describes the former 
process "selection" and the latter "combination": "The addressee perceives that the given 
utterance (message) is a COMBINATION of constituent parts (sentences, words, 
phonemes, etc.) SELECTED from the repository of all possible constituent parts (the 
code)" (75, capitalization in original text). Ultimately, what this amounts to is that every 
single speech act is related to two groupings of linguistic signs, one of which is obviously 
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present (the utterance) and the other set which is presupposed but in abeyance (the words 
that could have been selected but were not). 
However, it is when Jakobson illustrates the dual axis of language through the 
analysis of speech aphasia that we notice that his theory of a double-jointed linguistic 
structure does not preclude a discussion of environment and context, and this is because 
Jakobson must consider external relations of contiguity because it is used as a crutch by 
the aphasic who suffers from similarity disorder. So, while most of us are familiar with 
Two Fundamental Aspects of Language as a work that had major implications to our 
understanding of deep-linguistic structures, i.e., when Jacques Lacan applies Jakobson's 
theory to the unconscious (Chiesa 52), it is important to realize that Jakobson's clinical 
illustrations of similarity (and contiguity) disorder offer us a vantage point from which to 
consider the interaction of language and contexture. In the interest of clarity, a short 
summary of the similarity disorder is provided, after which we will consider its 
implications to a literary reading on the trace. 
Jakobson's general contention is that the two patterns of speech aphasia reflect 
language's structuration across both paradigmatic and syntagmatic lines. Similarity 
disorder manifests itself in an aphasic's inability to initiate conversation, name objects, 
repeat words, or grasp the meaning of a sentence or word without relying on the context 
and surrounding environment. This form of aphasia is described as "reactive" (Jakobson 
77) and "embedded in the verbal and non-verbal context" (Jakobson 78). This means that 
for the aphasic the metaphorical (paradigmatic) axis of language is entirely corrupted. 
The implicit linguistic codes that dictate that flower/blossom/pansy are equivalent units 
do not reach the speaker, nor do linguistic shorthands that would allow him or her to 
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shorten a word or sentence with conventionally agreed upon substitutes. In other words, 
even though the aphasic can speak, he is alienated from the socially contractual nature of 
language that direct the exchange and substitution of units in the abstract. That said, 
however, the aphasic suffering from similarity disorder has "intact contexture" (Jakobson 
83), meaning that her speech reflects her unimpaired ability to grasp internal and external 
relations of contiguity. The aphasic patient can react to a sentence fragment, the same 
way that she can ascertain the relations of contiguity that make up her surrounding 
context (be is it linguistic/conversation or external/environment). She immediately 
grasps the "gestalt" (87) to which a given object/linguistic unit belongs but would not be 
able to substitute any of its parts for another without getting lost. 
In order to compensate for their respective dysfunctions, we are also told aphasics 
rely heavily on the rhetorical tropes that structurally parallel their bias. Those with 
similarity disorder are said to depend heavily on metonymic figures of speech (Jakobson 
83), while those with contiguity disorder would rely on metaphoric language. On a 
certain level, this implies that the former is capable of substituting one lexical unit for 
another, but in line with Jakobson's prior observations, this substitution is offered and 
suggested by the context (be it actual or linguistic) in which a given object of reference is 
embedded. Metaphor and metonymy fall along different patterns of verbal aphasia, and 
Jakobson reads the preference for one or other figure a speech, not as an abnormality, but 
as the extreme embodiment of broad cultural trends. "In normal verbal behavior both 
processes are continually operative, but careful observation will reveal that under the 
influence of a cultural pattern, personality, and verbal style, preference is given to one of 
the two processes" (90). Forensic fiction, for instance, clearly exhibits degrees of 
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similarity disorder since it bases itself on the contiguous relations in the context of a 
crime/genocide. The drama of contiguity is a territorial movement that assimilates 
different elements across and within a landscape, a horizontal movement that draws the 
gaze from one object to another within a given context. How, then, does the horizontal 
thrust of contiguity relate to narrative? 
In delineating the aphasic's incapacity to speak without leaning on contextual 
markers and/or grounding himself on structural/external relations of contiguity, Jakobson 
writes: "To the stimulus hut one response was burnt out; another, is a poor little house. 
Both reactions are predicative; but the first creates a purely narrative context, while in the 
second there is a double connection with the subject hut: on the one hand, a positional 
contiguity, and on the other a semantic similarity" (91, italics in original). The aphasic 
with a similarity disorder, relying as he must on contiguity, is prone to offer forth a 
"narrative context"—the "house (is) burnt out". Earlier in the text, Jakobson cites similar 
instances where patients express their language disturbance by taking recourse in 
descriptions of the use or the action associated with a given object when they are at a loss 
to name it. I want to suggest that alongside the propensity to use synecdochic or 
metonymical figures, which Jakobson clearly considers the manifestation of a verbal 
preference by those with similarity disorder, that we bring to the foreground narrative as 
a second order repercussion of a heavy reliance on contiguity that are not offered in the 
spatial contours of the context: the verbs, actions that are presupposed and which must be 
provided a "narrative context" in speech. The incorporation of events within the field of 
contiguity echoes Susan Stewart's observation in On Longing (1984) that the 
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metonymical movement is not limited to objects alone, but also extends to experiences 
and actions (136). 
Perhaps the reason why we ignore the narrative imperative latent in contiguity and 
contextualization is that Jakobson's later turn to literary analysis (92-96) of poetic and 
prosaic genres makes it incredibly difficult to make a point of it in the midst of literary 
texts, where that impulse to narrative would itself be subsumed within greater narratives. 
Forensic and detective dramas are probably the closest examples of narrative contexts at 
our disposal since they thrive on the peculiarities of similarity disorder: while they have 
no problem naming objects, the full meaning of the traces they detect are in the external 
and presupposed relations of contiguity. In any case, Jakobson's analysis demonstrates 
how presupposed external relations of contiguity, which are not offered spatially but also 
temporally) serves as a productive contingency to narrative when an interlocutor needs to 
communicate this in speech. 
Metonymy is not a highly regarded figure of speech, principally because it isn't 
reserved to the conceptual level as metaphor allegedly is, and for that reason, is 
considered by many to be less creative, even less interesting. Hugh Bredin's article 
"Metonymy" (1986) tracks former attempts by various schools of thought (principally 
Group u), to situate metonymic relations along purely conceptual terms, i.e. "connotative 
connections" (49), in order to break its dependency on the referent and elect it to the 
platform of structuralism. But reading Bredin it seems these attempts were never too 
successful. The movement of metonymy repeats the map of temporal and spatial 
coordinates that most of us already assume to be true and even if these are 'assumptions' 
effected by the structures of signification, the phenomenological is difficult to bracket out 
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entirely. "A metonymy neither states nor implies the connection between objects 
involved in it. For this reason, it relies wholly upon those relations between objects that 
are habitually and conventionally known and accepted" (Bredin 57). If metonymy is the 
taken-for-granted of the workings of the life-world, what then are we to make of relations 
that are not widely presumed but must be demonstrated by an esoteric community to the 
general population? Is this not, after all, the case with forensic science, where the 
relations of contiguity between the length of a femur bone and life-span of the former 
owner of the bone is not readily available to the layman but is to a select group of 
knowledgeable individuals? In those circumstances textual and visual metonymic 
explication must turn itself over to narrative means, and in this way, becomes 'creative'; 
while it may not create new relations among things (as would metaphor), it is creative in 
so far as it inaugurates its own withdrawal and paves the way for the production of a text. 
And texts, we know, are difficult to contain. 
The argument that we could describe contiguity without narration (not simply 
presuppose it) is even more preposterous because describing an abductive context 
collapses the narratological distinction between description and narrative. In A 
Dictionary of Narratologv (1980), Gerald Prince explains: "description is the 
representation of objects, situations, or (non purposeful, non volitional) happenings in 
their spatial rather than temporal existence, their topological rather than chronological 
functioning, their simultaneity rather than succession" (19). In other words, description 
biases space whereas narration biases chronological succession. The generic distinction 
between description and narration is a weak one; and, as Peter Schwenger and Hayden 
White have recently shown, description is not any less interventionist or subjective than 
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narration . Nevertheless, I believe the distinction carries pedagogical merits here 
because the distinction, as fragile and contentious as it might be, serves, as a useful 
exercise in thinking of what description without narrativity would actually entail. 
To underline the gravity of narrational operations to the description of 
indexicality, we only need to consider what describing indexes without recourse to the 
basic figures of narration entails: the tautology of enumeration and the ahistoricism of 
synchronicity22. "The index asserts nothing," reminds Charles Sanders Peirce. 
Abductive indexes are dumb. Like all metonymic figures, they merely incite you to 
move somewhere else. Suspend the abductive index's link to linear time and beneath the 
tropological adhesive, strings give way to the staticness of dots.23 Fingerprint. Tooth. 
Dent. Scratch. Groove. Hair. Saliva. Semen. Blood. Bullet. Laceration. Mark. 
Shoe. Fissure. Flake. Thread. Trauma. Track. Smell. Spill. Drift. Oil. Feces. Patch. 
We love enumerating traces—each carries so much potential because we know enough of 
them to recognize that they displace the past in the present, but all of them are still 
fumbling dumb artifacts before we take up their cause (no pun intended). In its medium 
as vestige or artifact, pastness is valued in of itself and datability serves no purpose. 
The performative, and therefore rhetorical, gesture required for the re-animation 
of 'mute signs' should be obvious now: "The archeologist's craft consists in transforming 
indexicalities of decayed cultures into proto-indices and indices accessible to us. The 
21 
In "The Fictions of Factual Representation" (1976) Hayden White writes: "The issue of ideology points 
to the fact that there is no value-neutral mode of emplotment, explanation, or even description of any field 
of events, whether imaginary or real, and suggests that the very use of language itself implies or entails a 
specific posture before the world which is ethical, ideological, or more generally political: not only all 
interpretation, but also all language is politically contaminated." (34-35) 
22 
I borrow from Susan Stewart's On Longing: "The collection seeks a form of self-enclosure which is 
possible because of its ahistoricism" (151). 
Consider a poignant Norman Bryson quote selected by Peter Schwenger in The Tears of Things: 
Melancholy and Physical Objects (2007): "Still life is the world minus its narratives or, better, the world 
minus its capacity for generating narrative interest" (Bryson qtd. in Schwenger 99). 
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signs which he reads aloud for us where merely indexical grounds in the ongoing process 
of the bygone world" (Sonnessan "Indexicality" 3). What Goren Sonnessan means by 
"indexical ground" is nothing other than the relationalities always already cementing 
every trace within the fabric of the world. Everything is connected or contiguous to 
something else. What the archeologist, forensic scientist and other diviner professions do 
are isolate and trace those indexical relations such that those specific to a given trace are 
made intelligible to their audience. Knowing this, we can clearly discern the necessarily 
oratorical facet of divinatory methods, especially when their epistemological validity is 
not yet known among the greater public. The autopsy theatres of the 18th century were 
oratorical performances, a theatrics of scientific observation (van Dijk); the news 
coverage of Dr. Clyde Snow, Eric Stover, and other forensic practitioners on the field are 
no different. A case has to be made about the merits of the advances in medico-legal 
analyses of bodily remains. The place of narration, oratorical explication required for the 
communication of the "laws of nature," the relations of cause, contiguity and effect 
presupposed or inferred from traces is not solely the outcome of formal stimulus on the 
side of the sign. True, the trace must be traced across temporal boundaries, contiguity 
must be inferred and communicated due to the very nature of the sign itself; but, there are 
other motivations that come from without. Hippocrates, himself considered by many the 
father of semiotics, made it very clear that narrative explication is crucial to building the 
authority of the semiotician of'natural' signs. 
For if he discover and unaided by the side of his patients the present, the past, and the future, and 
fill in the gaps of the account given by the sick, he will be the more believed to understand the 
cases, so that men will confidently entrust themselves to him for treatment. Furthermore, he will 
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carry out the treatment best is he know beforehand from the present symptoms what will come 
later. (Hippocrates qtd. in Fineman 66-67) 
So, while the skilled doctor may infer the 'cause' and estimate the progression of a 
disease, its narration is doubly rhetorical in that it both fleshes out the relations that are 
inferred by the doctor and persuades the patient of the truth of his inferences. While the 
relations in the 'real world' between symptom and disease only exists to the patient 
through the performative aftermath of narrative explication, to the doctor their relation is 
discerned through inference and sign alone. In circumstances of public scientific 
explication, the historiographic detour serves as an authenticating gesture both to his 
episteme and to the actuality of the relation uniting the trace to its cause by making 
publicly available forms of knowledge normally honed by professional enclaves. 
However, the ritualistic narration from physical signs invariably naturalizes the 
assumption that traces are sites of narration. It is not just that non-intentional signs are 
metaphorically equated with typographic markings as we saw in "The Anatomy of an 
Analogy," it is that the contingent need to draw out contiguity is necessarily 
historiographic. The question now is: what kinds of histories are produced by the 
actualization of indexicality/contiguity? 
Literary theorist and new historicist Joel Fineman conjectures that Hippocrates' "medico 
historiographic method" marks the beginning of historiography because it was, he 
explains, the model upon which Thucydides would later draw upon for his 'scientific' 
and 'objective' historical method. However, Fineman goes on to argue that Hippocrates' 
medical semiotics was formative of a distinctly anecdotal historiographic form that 
subtends, disrupts and stands simultaneously against and with les grands recits (Lyotard) 
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of history. His chapter "The History of the Anecdote: Fiction and Fiction" (1991) 
explains that the anecdote is a literary form, the brevity and scale of which sets it in 
tension from the teleological inertia of historical narratives. The potential for "small 
stories" to fissure the fabric of grand histories and at once stake a claim to historical 
reality, made it such that the anecdotal form has received significantly more attention 
among academics. The anecdote's alleged claim to the "real", Fineman's most dubious 
though most seductive claim, is attributed to the reality effect of the mass of details 
visible from the smaller scale. The smallness, the peculiarity, the irreplaceably and the 
extremely contingent nature of the event which anecdotes communicate is why Fineman 
considers the anecdote the building block of all historiography, the "historeme, i.e., the 
smallest minimal unit of the historiographic fact" (67). The anecdote, we could say, is the 
historiographical equivalent of the microscopic. 
The anecdotal, as a formal category, overlaps and brings together two distinctly 
different historiographical forms. We can welcome an analogy between eyewitness and 
medico-legal testimony. Consider, for example, the definition of "anecdote" offered by 
the Oxford English Dictionary: "a short or amusing or interesting story about a real 
incident or person ii) an account regarded as unreliable." Joel Fineman's description of 
medico-legal histories qua anecdotes distances them from the stigma of unreliability; 
whereas the first-person narrative accounts of eyewitness testimonies are tainted with 
expectations of fallibity. Medico-legal micro-histories are not first person narratives, but 
rather narratives spun from the contingencies of having to explain and account for the 
presence of a trace in the present. The anecdotal form—especially when put forward as 
evidence, hovers precariously between hearsay and the distressing vicissitudes of first-
102 
person narration and memory. It constitutes the form of testimony that is inherently 
"self-referential" (Ricoeur)—I was there. I saw it, it's true. While is also a privileged 
entry into the complex articulation of personal and political (Gallop), it is also 
insurmountably private. 
Fineman's interjection allows for a better understanding of the limits, but also the 
appeals, of forensic historiography for human rights documentation. The trace offers a 
formal stimulus to narrative, but it is a narrative so peculiar and so specific to a time and 
space and a specific individual event in the past, that each could not on their own tell the 
story of, for instance, the Rwandan genocide. Forensic historiographies also 
conveniently and sizably fit the already anecdotal nature of eyewitness testimonies—the 
potential of which is often presented by NGO advocates practitioner's as a threat to the 
coherency of larger narratives offered by governments or political factions. The "small 
story" of the individual rape victim, the murdered child, may contradict larger historical 
narratives or corroborate them, but they cannot in themselves form them. 
The sheer mass of anecdotal narratives published in the news, fictionalized and 
dramatized in forensic dramas such as Crime Scene Investigation, Bones, Autopsy: 
Confessions of a Medical Examiner, etc., or reported back from the field from Physicians 
for Human Rights investigations suggests that medico-legal narratives have a value other 
than the need to establish scientific authority. Why is it that the bodily archives of the 
forensic scientist as sites of narration are so compelling? Why is our appetite for 
medico-legal histories seemingly insatiable? Schaffer and Smith's work on the rise of 
personal testimonies, and trauma narratives in the human rights domain, suggests that the 
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postmodern practice of storytelling reflects and is shaped by capitalist/Western economic 
and cultural forces where the "individual's uniqueness and unique story, and in individual 
rights, has gained international currency" (11). There is, they write, "an international 
market for local stories" (20)—one could say, a commodification on the anecdotal form, 
the "small story" that infuses every person's spatio-temporal trajectory with the prospect 
of the archivable, unrepeatable. The personal, local, anecdotal story is unrivaled in its 
particularity. The medico-legal micro-history is also unrivaled in its uniqueness. No two 
fingerprints are the same. Small stories (small details) are what give criminals away 
(Ginzberg), and like the sorrowful personal stories of traumatic suffering that have 
dominated human rights discourse since the Second World War, the medico-legal history 
is rife with sensational accounts of suffering and physical affliction. 
The particularity of the medico-legal anecdote hinges on the peculiarities of 
indices: "The body of any vertebrate, including human, is composed of a veritable 
armamentarium of more or less indexical markers of unique selfhood" (Sebeok 19). The 
infinite diversity of the human body, which the 'father' of forensic anthropology Jean 
Bertillion is famous for having discovered that no two individuals shared the exact bodily 
proportions, also means that the information gleaned from the medico-legal 
investigations serves the liberalist values of individualism embraced by the human rights 
movement. They approximate the biographical by remaining unique to the here and now 
of the body and of the crime scene, but in their identity with personal testimonies they 
also instill a hierarchy among them: medico-legal anecdotes are superior to eyewitness 
accounts because the materiality of the trace externalizes the experience of the deceased 
victim. Testimony from traces takes the interiority of the personal anecdote and 
104 
externalizes it through the material crutch of the organic sign, thus outdistancing the 
hermetic interiority of the living victim's memory. The personal and inaccessible are 
made share-able, someone else's private moments now available and disposable within 
the exchange economy of trauma narratives. The trinketry of forensic details takes on 
value when they are taken up by medico-legal histories—they become, for the moment, 
accessible, communal. "Apres la deuxieme guerre mondiale nous sommes tous des juifs" 
(Finkielkraut).24 
If medico-legal histories fit the discursive model of human rights advocacy in its 
particularity and its singularity, it also feeds into contemporary human rights discourse by 
conceptually and chronologically collapsing the archival and the narrative. Drawing on 
Susan Stewart's writings on the souvenir, I want to suggest that the instrumentality of 
medico-legal anecdotes to the general economy of contemporary story telling is sustained 
and posed by the irreplaceable (and therefore non-reproducible) status of the physical 
trace. Irreplaceability attracts story telling but when irreplaceable traces form abductive 
contexts it renders narration exigent. This is true not only because abductive contexts 
rely on narration for the purposes of actualization and authentication, but also because the 
distance between the trace and the event acts as a formal stimulus to a desire to recover 
the past and simultaneously ensures the prospect of narrative repetition. 
The cleavage of time signified by the organic sign is a void "experienced as loss; it is also 
experienced as a surplus of signification" (Stewart 135). The muteness of physical traces 
24 
This is inspired from Alain Finkielkraut's The Future of a Negation: Reflections on the Question of 
Genocide (1998) and Le juif imaginaire (1980) and is meant to hint the perverse repercussions of the mass 
appropriation of victim narratives, where the division between victim and perpetrator is circumvented 
through identification. Finkeilkraut, for example, considers the euphoric identification of the European 
community with the Jewish victims after the Second World War a rhetoric that is ethically frought. 
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drag along with them is excessive in their potentiality. The negative space hollowed out 
by the distance separating the sign from the moment of its production surfaces as a 
gnawing meaningless-ness in the same place where a semiotic relationality is already 
discerned. Signification is already happening—something is related to something else— 
but everything is still abstract except for the trace that is pain-full, both too full with 
content and yet too empty of everything else. It is frustrating to discern a relationality 
and lack the data to actualize it. That structural lack, so to speak, never really goes away 
for even in the phantasmatic movements of synecdoche or metonymy, the recuperative 
movement is always already a movement—a move away—that figures loss even as it 
tries to abolish it (Butler 71). Such is the plight of language, every attempt to grasp 
anything in full is also to displace, to move things about and to seek satisfaction by being 
once-removed from that which we seek. With the trace we are always once removed and 
through narrative we repeat our fate even as we delude ourselves of its opposite. With the 
trace, as with the trope, you can't stay put in the same place. Meaning is in the drift. The 
referent, or the object, to which the trace relates is always somewhere else—and like the 
referent which theories of language lost with the rise of semiology—the referent of the 
trace is a loss that we fumble to regain through its intermediary: the waste it leaves 
behind. 
Susan Stewart's chapter "Objects of Desire" is primarily concerned with the 
language of longing and nostalgia that surrounds the souvenir and the collection, but in it 
she masterfully maps out the dynamic between anteriority experienced as loss and the 
concomitant and ritualistic inauguration of narrative. According to Stewart, narrative is 
106 
motivated by the experience of loss and in an exchange economy; this loss is also 
experienced as a promise of reportability. She writes: 
We do not need or desire souvenirs of events that are repeatable. Rather we need and desire 
souvenirs of events that are reportable, events whose materiality has escaped us, events that 
thereby exist only through the invention of narrative. [...] Yet is only by means of its material 
relation to that location (where the event took place) that it acquires its value." (135) 
The longing for experiences that lie beyond our reach and cannot be re-experienced 
arises, Stewart explains, from the fact that our postmodern experience of the world is 
increasingly mediated through mechanical modes of production that heighten the sense 
that 'authentic' experiences are further retracting in the distance. While her comments 
concern souvenirs, the interaction between lack and textuality is one that can easily be 
transferred onto forensic traces within the human rights domain for the very reason that 
forensic traces are valued as sites of narration that will report events that would be 
otherwise forgotten or impossible to recover. The experiences of genocides where 
witnesses are absent are forever lost, their stories enduring only in the exchange and 
reiteration of testimonies. Thus, traces are prized in their incapacity to reproduce 
experiences and in their ability to "promise a text" (Cixous). 
The question of repetition, however, is not circumvented altogether in that the 
reporting of experiences and events that have escaped us emerges as a derivative 
pleasure—the pleasure experienced from momentarily recovering the facts of the event is 
extended and displaced onto the pleasures of hearing and telling stories, such that the 
practice of collecting traces also coincides with the pleasures of reporting the findings. It 
is precisely because traces don't speak for themselves, precisely because "indexes assert 
nothing" that the pleasures of reportability and narrative exchange are sustained, upheld 
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and expressed in the archival drive. The enduring muteness of organic signs is the 
structural abyss that ensures the ritualistic repetition of a narrative. 
Derrida reads the archival drive as the death drive. However, against more wide 
spread interpretations of the death drive as an instinct to self-annihilation, other 
contemporary scholars have emphasized the productive effectivity of repetition animated 
in and through the drive. Slavoj Zizek argues that the death drive is "the Freudian term 
for immortality" (qtd. in Delpech-Ramey 33), where the very insistence constitutive of 
repetition inadvertently emerges as a process, or practice, that works, despite itself, 
against the disappearance it supposedly yearns. As Lacan, quoting Sade, explains: "A 
philosopher in antiquity called war the mother of all things." (Sade qtd. in Lacan Ethics 
210, italics original) Zizek's qualification is lacanian in so far as he aligns the death 
drive with culture and the symbolic25, and not, as Freud did, with a biological impulse to 
return to an inorganic state. Putting aside the contradictions and complex hermeneutic 
disputes surrounding the death instinct, I want to reiterate the Lacanian reading of death 
drive as an expression of the will to start anew, to create something from nothing. Hence, 
the paradoxical insistence of a destructive drive actually triggers a cycle of production. 
The death drive is productive, and the insistence of the signifier is only the refusal of 
desire to surrender. Precisely because the event of the past cannot be recovered, because 
it belongs to a beyond that is only available to us in the fragmented deposits we later take 
up as traces, the struggle to overcome the mediation of language and, in the end, the 
erasure of the archive that is expressed in the death drive, only multiplies the signifier. 
25 
See the chapter "The Death Drive" in his Seminar on Ethics and Psychoanalysis, where Lacan aligns the 
death drive with history. Hence, the appropriation of Sade, who proposes that crime and destructive 
practices contribute to a sort of equilibrium. Lacan writes: "Production is an original domain, a domain of 
creation ex nihilo, insofar as it introduces into the natural world the organization of the signifier" (214). 
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Longing for what would bring about the death of desire and the death of language is to 
inaugurate language in the world. 
The productive aftermaths of the archival death drive are anecdotal narratives. It 
is an expectation that is marketed and sold by human rights practitioners, human rights 
groups and charlatans. The forensic turn within human rights ultimately means is that we 
are witnessing a veritable rise of medico-legal anecdotes as a genre of historiography that 
suggests itself as the equivalent of spoken testimonies. The repeated insistence of 
forensic scientists of the testamental value of forensic evidence is at once a reflection of 
the productive consequences of abductive indices and the place of the latter in an 
exchange economy where trauma narratives, small stories, circulate in the name of 
human rights. 
109 
Closing Thoughts: Paranoia, Aggressivity and Human Rights 
It is difficult to offer forth a conclusion when our tropology leaves us with several 
questions and few certainties. There are nevertheless a few worth repeating outright. 
This piece reflected on a historically verifiable transfer of oral testimony to testimonial 
trace in the rhetoric of forensic human rights advocates. Each chapter read this tropic 
drift against a grounded, and I think consistent, conception of the limitations and 
possibilities of indexical signification. Traces do not tell stories, do not possess any 
intrinsic meaning, do not testify to their objects; but within our forensic culture they are 
libidinal zones caught in economies of desire that also constitute formal motivations to 
narrative explication and anthropomorphization. It is tempting, given the comparative 
semiotic ineptitude of physical traces to want to cease reading or seeking meaning. But if 
I cared only for what was real about the materiality of traces, I would have had to lead 
you to trauma, the Lacanian Real, the Kristevan abject. I do not deny the place of the 
abject, trauma or the Real—especially when death and genocidal scenes are at stake—but 
if my analysis angled itself along these terms the theatrics and the drama of meaning, 
with all that is ethically fraught about it, would disappear before our eyes. 
Eelco Runia, Dutch historian and psychologist, recently complained that trauma 
literature "cater(s) to the same need to reflect on time and memory, failure and success" 
but in a way that is politically correct in today's alleged crisis of representation (4). The 
politics of representation and trauma are copular; they belong to a "structure of feeling" 
(Williams) and both struggle with the duplicity of language and its incapacity to 
assimilate and offer a perfect reflection of the real; and both, regardless of the 
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misappropriations of a handful of historians, struggle with our relation to events of the 
past. Broaching the topic of history and representation today means to be subject to 
"widely held assumptions about the constitutive failure of linguistic representation in the 
post-Holocaust, post-Hiroshima, Post-Vietnam era" (Leys Genealogy 268). Ruth Leys 
explains in Trauma: A Genealogy (2000) that the catastrophic events of the last several 
decades are thought to have inaugurated a "post-traumatic century" (Felman and Laub 
qtd. in Leys 268) where our perennial inability to assimilate them meaningfully causes us 
to re-experience the violence of the events even as they elude us. To over-simplify 
things, the post-traumatic era places survivors in the paradoxical position of "listening to 
[,] truths that are unspoken—or unspeakable" (Felman and Laub xiii-xiv). Much of the 
post-modern interest in the question of representation and history, therefore, bears a filial 
relation to the supposedly 'original' trauma (the Jewish Holocaust of the Second World 
War). The "taboo against meaning," which Runia perceives at the intersection of 
representationalism and trauma literature, indexes the ubiquitous influence trauma 
literature (and the Holocaust as phantasmatic origin) has had on discussions of historical 
representation, as it does the corresponding rhetorical and ethical crisis brought about by 
linguistic scepticism. In fact, Runia's disparagement registers an ethical conundrum at 
the heart of the postmodern historiography: how should we respond and where are we 
confronted with a need to respond? 
The modality of address generated by some adherents of a popular brand of 
trauma literature could be said to correspond to "a mode of existence" (Caruth 100) 
conditioned by the impossibility of responding to traumatic events. The impasse 
preventing the symbolic rehabilitation of difficult events not only retains the witness 
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and/or survivor in a state of suspended consciousness but this self-same cluelessness 
actualizes a bond, a sense of obligation, between the living and dead, victim and 
perpetrator. Indeed, submitting and familiarizing others with the "impact of 
incomprehensibility" (Caruth 6) is central to the performance of this scholarly literature 
and proposed rhetoric. Because the psyche is fissured by the traumatic event, theorist 
Cathy Caruth has argued that the address of the other (the dead, if you will) is located 
precisely in the "language of trauma," in the unwitting repetition of the traumatic event in 
the survivor and interlocutor alike. Repetition, as a form of deferred action, is what 
allows the voice of the other to be heard despite its elusiveness. "The language of 
trauma," a language constituted through the aporias of language, is a performative 
achievement that precludes understanding of its cause even as it makes itself felt. The re-
enactment of trauma or, alternatively, the transmission of trauma (Caruth; Leys) is 
presented as a mode of a-symbolic action generative of encounters with the real 
(Lacanian); "a speaking that awakens others" (Caruth 108) to the experience of trauma. 
Thus, the repetition and transmission of traumatic incomprehension is a rhetoric; the 
summons of the dead and of the traumatized are conveyed precisely in the lapses of 
signification. Caruth's theory explicitly exposes the willed functional effect of her 
scholarship: it places the interlocutor in a position to listen "to the address of another, an 
address that remains enigmatic yet demands a listening, (and) a response" (9). Caruth's 
work on trauma is questionable (and Ruth Leys makes a convincing case that it lacks any 
credibility whatsoever, principally because it is based on faulty empirical research) but it 
is emblematic of a widespread impulse to privilege those occasions where the orders of 
signification are unsettled. We do well to take notice of the incessant way in which 
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discussions pertaining to death, corpses, and their witnessing lead us to aporias, structural 
gaps, and the limits of signification. But is this academic analogue of a 'moment of 
silence' the only reasonable way to respond to the conundrum we face? 
Cathy Caruth wants us to situate the "voices of the dead" in the language of 
trauma, forensic scientists want us to see the voices of the dead on the side of physical 
traces. I am suspicious of both. Should we substantiate the presence of the dead—the 
meaning of their trauma—in the aporias, there where representation slips away because 
we can't face the truth? or with physical traces where representation also seems to 
evaporate as an issue? Trauma and traces both promise the same thing: an escape hatch 
from the messiness of representation; both want a rhetoric without mediation because 
both claim they are really tied to the past. At least that is how the story goes. We really 
have to wonder how far the analogy between traumatic testimony and testimonial traumas 
really extends—even their genealogies seem to overlap. If a rhetoric of traumatic 
witnessing is traced back to the Second World War, the same goes for the Humanities 
preoccupation with trauma. But what about meaning? 
Meaning is messy. Meaning is where we think we are and where we project 
ourselves. Meaning is ethically contentious. If there is one substantive (but symmetrical) 
difference between traumatic witnessing and forensic trace, it is that trauma takes the 
place of meaning with the former and forensic traces ask us to anticipate meaning. And 
so the question is what impact will this have on a wider scale (i.e. what sort of 
subjectivity does this create)? And what might this mean for human rights? 
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Paranoia 
The question of anticipation was regularly brought up throughout the previous chapters. 
The rhetoric of forensic science asks us to wait for meaning. Eric Stover and Clyde 
Snow in Srebrenica do not know what exactly they will find, but they have an inkling that 
it is worth their time and ours. A forensic pathologist leads us to an autopsy chamber and 
informs us that every corpse tells a story. The fact of meaning is posited but as of yet, it 
is not embodied. This is suspicion; like a woman suspicious that her husband might be 
unfaithful starts to record his comings and goings, the time he calls and the times he does 
not. She avoids washing his trousers. She smells his shirt collar. He mentioned the 
neighbor twice last week; maybe she's the mistress? When the forensic scientist is called 
to a place suspected of holding proof of war crimes and rights abuse, everything felt to be 
significant must be recorded. If there is a mishap, the scene is "contaminated." Such is 
the cumulative effect of abductive indices, which we explored in "The Way of the 
Anecdote": "It doesn't matter what it means, it's still signifying. [...] The paranoic shares 
this impotence of the deterritorialized signs assailing him from every direction" (Deleuze 
and Guattari 112). The forensic culture reinforces our already paranoid subjectivity. We 
can never know in advance what will signify what, but we are certain that the substance 
of the grave is meaningful. How is it possible that a sign be meaningful and not signify 
anything? Chapter Two "The Trace qua Index" distinguished between meaning and 
information, and we saw that information is not a requisite to meaning. Meaning is a 
subjective phenomenon that is implicated even when it is merely assumed. Because 
"meaning always refers to another meaning" (Psychoses 119), as Lacan says, anything 
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can become meaningful. Information has nothing to do with it. Information is not 
compulsory for meaning to be an issue, culture is. 
Aggressivity and Human Rights 
We are all paranoiacs, according to Lacan, given that our egos are structurally paranoiac. 
As subjects of the imaginary we are so desperate to fully embody the Ideal-ego that once 
we recognize that ideal in another we fear that it will take our place, and so we compete 
with it and, in the extreme, desire the death of our rival.26 The paranoia of the imaginary 
differs slightly from the paranoia of the forensic scientist, but both in historical and 
subjective terms occupy the same place. The paranoid subjectivity that presents itself in 
our forensic episteme coincides with an aggressivity discernible in human rights 
discourse. Human rights discourse is structurally paranoiac as well. Being premised on a 
rhetoric of identification it has the advantage of serving as an imaginary lure for the 
witness and bystander and so, involves the other emotionally and has him 'step in his 
shoes.' Lacan shared a poignant anecdote: ' "Take upon yourself, he [the patient to the 
analyst] tells us, "the suffering that weighs so heavily on my shoulders; but I can see that 
you are far too content, composed, and comfortable to be worthy of bearing it" 
("Aggressivity" 15).' There is a frustration that comes from sharing one's suffering with 
the other. The victim resents the unnecessarily interested bystander but also, the 
bystander responds in kind with his own imaginary aggressivity. 
It would seem counter to logic or common sense that we should envy the victim 
but the culture of human rights and its heavy reliance on identification is already showing 
See Lacan's dissertation La psychose paranoiaque et ses rapports avec la personnalite (1975) 
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its aggressivity. A television advertisement for the Campaign for Diversity airing at the 
present time demonstrates the conundrum perfectly: "I am a Muslim when I read about 
discrimination. I am a Jew when I read about the Holocaust." The fact is that the 
teenager who is coming to this realization is not Jewish, and the girl who is standing 
upright in the commercial is not disabled. Do we really have a reason to be surprised to 
find aggressivity wield its head when testimony leads to pan-traumatism? When divisions 
between self and other are blurred? The problem of aggressivity is doubly felt when 
resentment and envy are directed at the victims. Alain Finkielkraut in The Future of a 
Negation: The Question of Genocide (1998) is concerned that the widespread 
identification wjth the victims of the Jewish Holocaust has doubled into a perverse anti-
Semitism, where advocates of the victims of other atrocities (no less worthy of our 
attention) feel that the "Jewish question" is monopolizing. This is imaginary aggressivity 
in its extreme and it is what makes it commonplace for two individuals to hypothetically 
argue with each other whether or not the gay white man has it worse off than the brown 
hetero woman. Rivalry is a symptom already making itself apparent in the identification 
between victim, indifferent bystander, and perpetrator and it is still an open question what 
the combination of traumatic transmission and imaginary rivalry will do to our 
conception of man-made mass death and/or structural oppression. 
We do not know what forensic science will bring to human rights investigations because 
like the child dead-set on his own image in the mirror, we are still in a phase of 
anticipation. Forensics is still only a promise to the human rights domain, a promise that 
already has a considerable number of international organizations, factions and political 
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bodies sharing in the gamble. If anything, our tropology leaves us with a few important 
questions about its future. What will we lose or gain if eyewitness testimony is 
superseded by forensic evidence? What kind of subjectivity are we upholding and 
cementing as more and more of our world acquires a forensic value? What are we risking, 
within and beyond the academy, as we veer our attentions away from meaning? And, 
what, we have to ask ourselves, will be the consequence of a discourse where human 
rights, trauma and victim testimony are only iterable via identification? 
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